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THE DOMESTIC EFFECT OF SOUTH 
AFRICA’S TREATY OBLIGATIONS: THE 
RIGHT TO EDUCATION AND THE 




On 16 June 2020, the President of South Africa returned the Copyright 
Amendment Bill [B-13 of 2017] to Parliament, expressing reservations 
regarding its constitutionality and compliance with international law. In this 
paper, I describe the constitutional implications of compliance with 
international law and the binding international obligations incumbent upon 
South Africa in respect of copyright and international human rights law. In 
doing so, I argue that the Bill of Rights acts as a magnet, compelling all 
organs of state to give greater normative weight to those international 
obligations that map onto the Bill of Rights as compared to those that do not 
in their functioning. Finally, I explain how the provisions of the CAB that are 
specifically tailored to enable access to educational materials for all are not 
only permitted under South Africa’s international copyright obligations, but 
are required by the Bill of Rights and South Africa’s international human 
rights obligations.  
 
 
                                                 
1 DPhil candidate, University of Oxford; former foreign law clerk at the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa (2018). This working paper draws on my doctoral research on ‘The Right of 
Access to Educational Materials’, that focuses on the intersection between international 
copyright and human rights law – on the international plane, as well as in India and South 
Africa. Many thanks to Andrew Rens, Dire Tladi, Jonathan Klaaren, Klaus Beiter, Sean 
Flynn and Jason Brickhill for engaging with my work. 
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INTRODUCTION  
South Africa’s process of copyright reform has been underway for the 
past 15 years. The current Copyright Amendment Bill B-13 of 2017 (CAB), 
after numerous public consultations and parliamentary deliberations, passed 
by both houses of Parliament on 28 March 2019. The Bill was on the 
President’s desk for assent thereafter for a period of no less than 14 months, 
following which the President returned the Bill to Parliament on 16 June 2020 
on the basis that he had reservations regarding its constitutionality. 
Meanwhile, the existing copyright regime, governed by the Copyright Act 98 
of 1978 and its attendant regulations, continues to apply, and continues to 
exclude and disadvantage persons with disabilities from accessing works 
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under copyright; students who cannot afford the high prices of textbooks and 
other educational materials; and creators who cannot sustain their livelihoods. 
The pandemic that has swept the world has further exacerbated these 
inequalities, and created new problems with the increase in online activity, as 
the Copyright Act 1978 is not tailored to the digital environment. The CAB 
seeks to remedy all of the above and has thus acquired more urgency than 
ever before. 
At the time of writing, Parliament has yet to decide on its next steps after 
having received the President’s referral letter. The CAB and the President’s 
reservations are being analysed by a team of legal academics. We have 
collaboratively published and are currently workshopping analyses of the 
Bill’s reversion right, fair use right, and of the Minister’s Regulatory 
authority. This paper addresses the role of international law, particularly with 
respect to the educational provisions of the Bill.2 
I explain that these reservations are outside the ambit of the constitutional 
provisions enabling the President to return statutes to Parliament. Moreover, 
even if these concerns were within the scope of the relevant provision 
empowering the President to return legislation, they were misplaced and 
based on an erroneous interpretation of the role of international law in the 
South African Constitution. This has serious implications for Parliament’s 
law-making function that I outline in the course of this article.  
In order to determine the proper interpretation of the applicable 
provisions in the Constitution, I first outline the relevant international rights 
and obligations at issue. I do this by mapping the network of treaty 
obligations that South Africa has undertaken in respect of copyright and 
international human rights law. I focus particularly on the right to education 
in international human rights law and the obligations that it imposes on South 
Africa. I use the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to determine what 
these international obligations mean, the implications of these obligations 
binding South Africa on the international plane, and the amplitude that they 
offer South Africa in domestic implementation of international treaty 
obligations.  
Second, I explain how the Constitution necessarily acts as a constraining 
frame for all legislation, including that which seeks to implement South 
                                                 
2 The other concerns that the President outlined in the Referral Letter were as follows: 
first, whether the Copyright Amendment Bill was correctly tagged under s 75 of the 
Constitution; second, whether the royalty provisions in the Bill constituted an arbitrary and 
retrospective deprivation of property under s 25 of the Constitution; third, whether the 
delegation of power to the minister to promulgate regulations pursuant to the Bill on the issue 
of royalties was a permissible delegation of power; fourth, whether there was adequate public 
participation on the provisions regarding fair use and fifth, whether the copyright exceptions 
and limitations were constitutional. See The Presidency, Referral of the Copyright 
Amendment Bill [B13B-2017] and the Performers Protection Amendment Bill [B24- 2016] 
(‘Referral Letter’) available at: http://infojustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/ramaphosa06162020.pdf 
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Africa’s international obligations on the domestic plane. In doing so, I 
explore how international obligations that map onto the Bill of Rights are 
treated by the Constitution and their consequent domestic effect. I 
specifically outline the difference in constitutional treatment between 
obligations that map onto the Bill of Rights, from international obligations 
that do not map onto the Bill of Rights. In short, Parliament has a greater 
normative constitutional imperative to give effect to obligations that map 
onto the Bill of Rights (in other words, international human rights 
obligations) as opposed to those that do not.  
Finally, I discuss how the sum of South Africa’s binding international 
obligations creates a wide berth of policy space within which Parliament is 
empowered to make laws. I outline how the referred provisions of the CAB 
fall squarely within this space. More than simply being permitted by 
international law, however, I explain how in drafting and passing the CAB, 
Parliament acted in several respects to discharge its constitutional duty in 
prioritising policy choices that accord with the Bill of Rights, and to bring the 
apartheid-era Copyright Act within the constitutional framework. To act 
otherwise would contravene the strong protections entrenched in the Bill of 
Rights. 
 COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
South Africa is party to two sets of international obligations that are 
relevant to the CAB: international copyright instruments; and international 
human rights law instruments, given that the creation and regulation of 
copyright has significant implications for a number of human rights.3 In this 
section, I map both sets of international treaty obligations and implications 
of these obligations binding on South Africa. Although the paper deals 
specifically with the right to education, the analysis is replicable for other 
human rights obligations that are implicated, such as the freedom of 
expression, participation in cultural life amongst others. 
On the international plane, treaties create binding international 
obligations upon states once states have consented to be bound by them, 
                                                 
3 See, for examples of work at the intersection of copyright and human rights, Laurence 
R. Helfer and Graeme W. Austin, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping the 
Global Interface (Cambridge University Press 2011).; Margaret Chon, ‘Intellectual Property 
from below: Copyright and Capability for Education’ (2006) 40 UC Davis L. Rev. 803.; 
Sharon E. Foster, ‘The Conflict between the Human Right to Education and Copyright’, in 
Paul Torremans (Ed.), Intellectual Property and Human Rights at 287-8 (Kluwer, 2008).  
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depending on the requirements of the treaty:4 through signature,5 ratification6 
or accession.7 In South Africa, the executive branch of government is 
empowered to negotiate and sign a treaty without putting it before 
Parliament,8 as long as the treaty complies with the Constitution.9 Parliament 
is empowered to make the decision as to whether a treaty is required to be put 
before it prior to ratification.  
After a state deposits its consent to be bound with the treaty depositary 
designated in the treaty, it is bound to fulfil the provisions of the treaty in 
good faith.10 For those treaties that provide for both signature and ratification, 
in the period between signature and ratification, states’ domestic constitutions 
may provide for internal domestic conditions to be fulfilled before states 
move to ratify or accede to a treaty. The South African Constitution provides 
for certain categories of treaties to be put before Parliament for approval 
before ratification or accession, so that Parliament may decide whether 
domestic action is necessary, such as updating legislation.11 Certain other 
categories of treaties must be put before Parliament for approval by resolution 
after ratification or accession.12 If any organ of state acts in contravention of 
the international obligations that the treaty in question imposes, another state 
party may hold the defaulting state responsible in the relevant international 
                                                 
4 See, for an up to date explanation of consent to be bound and the various expressions 
that it may take, Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Panos Merkouris, Treaties in Motion: The 
Evolution of Treaties from Formation to Termination (CUP 2020) at 96-120. 
5 In some treaties, signature itself is an expression of consent to be bound to the broad 
objectives as well as specific provisions of the treaty, while others require signature and 
ratification to bind parties to specific provisions of the treaty. In circumstances where treaties 
require both signature and ratification, the international legal effect of signature differs from 
ratification and accession. Where a state signs a treaty, it is signalling its consent to be bound 
by the broad objectives of the treaty. The signature creates a limited international obligation 
upon the state (pending ratification) not to undertake acts that undermine or frustrate the 
treaty’s broad aims. See Articles 10 and 18, VCLT. 
6 Arts.2 (1) (b), 14 (1) and 16, VCLT. Ratification and accession have the same 
international legal effect – that it binds the state internationally not only to the broad 
objectives of the treaty but also to the specific provisions of the treaty. This is subject to any 
reservations that the state makes to explicitly limit its consent to be bound to the treaty as 
detailed in Arts.2 (1) (d) and 19-23 of the VCLT. 
7 Arts.2 (1) (b), 14 (2), 15 VCLT. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets 
out the rules by which treaties are to be governed in international law. United 
Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 1155, p. 331 (VCLT). 
8 Section 231(1), Constitution. 
9 Law Society of South Africa and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others [2018] ZACC 51; 2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC); 2019 (3) SA 30 (CC). (‘Law 
Society’) 
10 Article 26, VCLT. Anthony Aust, Pacta Sunt Servanda, Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (February 2007), available at http://opil.ouplaw.com (outlining the 
customary international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, which means that agreements 
must be honoured in good faith). 
11 Section 231(2), Constitution. 
12 Section 231(3), Constitution. 
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tribunal on the international plane.13 
 This section is limited to mapping the network of treaties that 
internationally bind South Africa in the above ways. I will turn to the 
domestic effect that these binding treaties have in the subsequent sections. 
   Copyright Treaties  
South Africa is party to several treaties on copyright. These treaties 
impose obligations upon South Africa to pass legislation to create and 
regulate copyright, and enable South Africa to exclude certain works and uses 
of works from the ambit of copyright.  
The Berne Convention is the oldest multilateral treaty on copyright, 
dating back to 1886. South Africa is party to the Berne Convention,14 
obliging South Africa to create a domestic copyright regime that is in 
accordance with its obligations under this Convention so that the works of all 
countries that are party to the Convention are treated similarly. South Africa 
passed the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 to give domestic effect to the most 
recent revision of the Berne Convention (the Paris Act, 1971).15 The Berne 
Convention permits member states to statutorily exclude a number of uses 
from the ambit of copyright– “illustrations […] for teaching” being one of 
them.16 In fact, the Copyright Act 1978 uses identical language of the Berne 
Convention in its provision excepting the use of works under copyright for 
                                                 
13 A state would do this by ensuring that the claim satisfies the ingredients outlined in 
the the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International 
Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 
10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc) adopted by the 
General Assembly, 8 January 2008, A/RES/62/61. See generally, James Crawford, State 
Responsibility, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (September 2006), 
available at http://opil.ouplaw.com (outlining the status of the Articles of State 
Responsibility and their application and content).  
14 As a former colony, the Berne Convention previously applied to the territory of 
present-day South Africa through the United Kingdom’s application in 1887. The erstwhile 
Union of South Africa deposited an instrument of continued application of the Berne 
Convention in 1928. The Berne Convention underwent several revisions, of which the 
erstwhile Union of South Africa ratified the Brussels Act in 1950, and the succeeding 
Republic of South Africa (the apartheid state) acceded to the Paris Act in 1974. Although 
apartheid South Africa made certain reservations to the Paris Act, by virtue of present-day 
South Africa’s membership of the World Trade Organisation and consequent accession to 
the TRIPS Agreement, the substantive provisions of the Paris Act of the Berne Convention 
are applicable to present-day South Africa. South Africa is thus bound by the Berne 
Convention. The only reservation that continues to remain is South Africa’s reservation to 
the International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding the Berne 
Convention. See South Africa, Berne Convention: Treaties and Contracting Parties, WIPO, 
available at: https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/remarks.jsp?cnty_id=1026C.  
15 Republic of South Africa House of Assembly Debates, 31 March 1978, vol 77, cols 
3638, 3644, 3646 (pointing to references by Members of Parliament explaining the purpose 
of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 as incorporating the most recent revisions of the Berne 
Convention. At the time, it was a Bill passing through the House of Assembly). 
16 Article 10(2), Berne Convention. 
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“illustrations […] for teaching”. Moreover, the Berne Convention permits 
states parties to legislate to exclude other uses, as long as they fulfil three 
criteria – that they are a certain special case; that they do not interfere with 
the normal exploitation of the work; and that they do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.17  
South Africa has not deposited a notification with WIPO regarding the 
application of the Berne Appendix. In any event, the Appendix to the Berne 
Convention has been widely documented18 to be ‘unrealistic’,19 a ‘dead 
letter’,20 an ‘abject failure’21 and have effected “no real improvement in 
access to copyright materials”.22  
As a founding member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), South 
Africa is automatically party to the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.23 The TRIPS Agreement incorporates 
the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention.24 As a result, South 
Africa is bound by both the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention 
and the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS Agreement obliges South Africa to 
                                                 
17 Article 9(2), Berne Convention. Known as the three-step test.   
18 See Daniel J Gervais, "Appendix 2 The Berne Appendix unpacked" in (Re)structuring 
Copyright: A Comprehensive Path to International Copyright Reform, Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017 (explaining the Berne Appendix and its effectiveness). See 
also Susan Isiko Štrba,"Special Legal Regimes for Access to Education in Developing 
Countries". International Copyright Law and Access to Education in Developing Countries. 
Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff, 2012 (describing the circumstances around the 
conclusion of the Berne Appendix as one reason for its ineffectiveness, amongst others).    
19 Alberto Cerda Silva, ‘Beyond the Unrealistic Solution for Development Provided by 
the Appendix of the Berne Convention on Copyright’, PIJIP Research Paper no. 2012-08 
American University Washington College of Law, Washington, D.C. (analysing the Berne 
Appendix and pointing to where and how the Berne Appendix has failed in enabling the 
dissemination of educational materials in developing countries, as well as suggesting the way 
forward for a new instrument that better addresses the needs of developing countries). 
20 Victor Nabhan, WIPO Standing Committee On Copyright And Related Rights, Study 
On Limitations And Exceptions For Copyright For Educational Purposes In The Arab 
Countries 56-57 (2009), available at 
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_19/sccr_19_6.doc (analysing Arab countries’ 
responses to the Berne Appendix and reasons for its disuse).  
21 Alan Story, Study on Intellectual Property Rights, the Internet, and Copyright, Study 
Paper 5, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, available at: 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp5_story_study.pdf (focusing on 
access to educational materials under copyright in the 50 poorest and least developed 
countries as identified by the WTO) 
22 Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International IP Standard-Setting, Study 
Paper 8, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, available at: 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp8_drahos_study.pdf (discussing 
the extent of participation of developing countries in international intellectual property 
lawmaking and its impact on the law). 
23 TRIPS is Annex 1C of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, 
available at: ‘WTO Legal Texts’, (WTO Documents, Data, Resources) 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#TRIPs. 
24 Article 9, TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS Agreement explicitly incorporates Articles 
1-21 of the Berne Convention into its text. 
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make available effective enforcement procedures for copyright (among other 
intellectual property rights) and remedies for infringement.25 Moreover, the 
TRIPS Agreement reiterates the three-step test stating that exceptions and 
limitations should be confined to certain special cases that do not interfere 
with the normal exploitation of the work and that do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder.26 Additionally, when 
giving domestic effect to their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, 
member states are empowered to take measures that protect the public interest 
(including socio-economic and technological development).27 In legislating 
pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement, member states must ensure that the 
objectives outlined in the Agreement are met – technological innovation, 
benefiting both creators and users to support socio-economic welfare and 
ensuring that there is a balance of rights and obligations.28  
South Africa ratified the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
Convention in 1974, thereby becoming a member of WIPO. Although South 
Africa signed the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty in 1997, it is only as recently as 28 March 2019 that the 
Parliament tabled and approved the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, and the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual 
Performances under section 231(2) of the Constitution.29 South Africa has 
not yet deposited its instrument of ratification in respect of any of these 
treaties. I return to this point in the next section as this is in connection with 
the CAB. 
Most recently, although South Africa played a crucial role in the 
negotiations leading up to the adoption of the 2013 Marrakesh Treaty to 
Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually 
Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled (‘Marrakesh VIP Treaty’), South 
Africa is not yet party to the treaty. The delegate for South Africa clarified 
during the negotiations of the Marrakesh Treaty that  
‘[t]his treaty will have a meaningful impact on the lives of millions of 
blind and visually impaired persons both in the developed and developing 
world […] South Africa is embarking on the process of reviewing its 
copyright legislation and will accede to the Treaty when all internal 
processes are concluded’.30  
The Copyright Amendment Bill, through its provisions on making 
                                                 
25 Part III, TRIPS Agreement. 
26 Article 13, TRIPS Agreement. 
27 Article 8, TRIPS Agreement. 
28 Article 7, TRIPS Agreement. 
29 ‘Parliament Passes 11 Bills’, (Parliament of South Africa, 28 March 2019) 
<https://www.gov.za/speeches/parliament-passed-11-bills-today-28-mar-2019-0000> 
accessed on 10 May 2019. 
30 As quoted in the ‘Briefing Paper, Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Guide South 
Africa’, (UCT IP Unit, May 2015) <http://ip-unit.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/IPUnit_MarrakeshGuideSA1.pdf> accessed on 15 May 2019  
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accessible copyrighted works for those with print and visual disabilities 
amongst others, is intended to bring South Africa’s domestic legislative 
framework in line with the Marrakesh VIP Treaty in order to facilitate 
ratification. The Marrakesh VIP Treaty seeks to reverse historical neglect of 
persons with visual and print disabilities in respect of creating and making 
accessible works under copyright. It invokes the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities in its Preamble and imposes a set of 
obligations upon states to enable the format shifting of works as well as cross-
border exchange of such works in order to facilitate access for persons with 
visual and print disabilities.31  
Before moving to the next set of obligations, a short overview of the 
three-step test and its relationship with other provisions in international 
copyright law relevant to access to educational materials is apposite. The 
Berne Convention, TRIPS Agreement and WIPO Internet Treaties all 
encapsulate variants of the three-step test.32 The Berne Convention, as 
outlined above, also includes a specific exception with a different test for uses 
that fall within the definition of “illustrations…for teaching” that must be 
compatible with “fair practice” and “to the extent justified by the purpose”.33 
Where exceptions and limitations fall outside of that definition, the three-step 
test is the applicable test.34 In any event, even if it is arguable that the three-
step test has blanket application across all legislated exceptions,35 the 
interpretation of the three-step test is far from settled in international law.36 
                                                 
31 Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, 
Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, 2013 available at: 
https://www.wipo.int/marrakesh_treaty/en/. 
32 Andrew F. Christie and Robin W. Wright, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Three-Step 
Tests in International Treaties’, (2014) IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property 
and Competition Law, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2014, U of Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 715 (outlining the similarities and differences in the three-step test outlined across the 
international copyright treaties). 
33 Article 10(2), Berne Convention. See also, Raquel Xalabarder, Study on Copyright 
Limitations and Exceptions for Educational Activities in North America, Europe, Caucasus, 
Central Asia and Israel, WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, 
SCCR/19/8, Nineteenth Session, Geneva, December 14-18, 2009 (making the point that the 
educational exceptions to copyright have existed since the very inception of the Berne 
Convention in 1886, only the language has varied).  
34 Article 9(2), Berne Convention. See also, Expert Report of Professor Lionel Bently in 
the case of Cambridge University Press and Others v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services and 
Another, CS(OS) No 2439 of 2012, on file with author at 52-53 (endorsing this interpretation 
of the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement in respect of educational exceptions). 
35 See the argument also traversed in Edson Beas Rodrigues Jr, The General Exception 
Clauses of the TRIPS Agreement: Promoting Sustainable Development (Cambridge 
University Press 2012). (particularly the chapter focusing on the three-step test in Brazil). 
36 See, for a sample, Patrick Goold, ‘The Interpretive Argument for a Balanced Three-
Step Test? (2017) American University International Law Review’, 33(1), pp. 187-230. 
(outlining the various possibilities available in interpreting the three-step test); Christophe 
Geiger, Daniel Gervais and Martin Senftleben, ‘The Three-Step Test Revisited: How to Use 
the Test’s Flexibility in National Copyright Law,’ (2013). PIJIP Research Paper no. 2013-
04 (explaining the various interpretations of the three-step test in the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
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What is clear, however, is that it may be interpreted in several ways, in line 
with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,37 taking into account the 
object and purpose of the version being interpreted in the context of the treaty 
as well as surrounding context such as other international obligations and 
domestic priorities.38 Moreover, it is not necessary for the language of the 
three-step test to be directly imported into domestic laws for a limitation 
pursuant to it to be valid.39 
The referral of the Copyright Amendment Bill back to Parliament by the 
President specifically raises concerns regarding the Bill’s compliance with 
the WCT, the WPPT and the Marrakesh VIP Treaty. In the analysis that 
follows I consider whether these concerns are well-founded and consider the 
implications of these treaties for Parliament in drafting the CAB.   
 Human Rights Treaties 
Since copyright is fundamentally a restriction on the free flow of 
information, it inevitably attracts the application of international human 
rights law. The international human rights law treaties have tended to be 
neglected in the debates concerning the CAB. Opponents of the Bill tend to 
ignore them entirely, and the President did not accord them their proper 
interpretation as evinced in the letter referring the CAB back to Parliament.40 
As I explain, these treaties map closely onto the Bill of Rights and therefore 
must be given greater weight (than those treaties that do not map onto the Bill 
of Rights) when Parliament carries out its law-making function. I explain this 
significance in the section on the greater normative imperative provided by 
international human rights law in the South African context in my next 
section. 
Although I focus only on the right to education in the rest of this paper, 
                                                 
and the Berne Convention, as well as the WTO’s interpretation of the three-step test in Panel 
Rep. of 15 June 2000, United States-Article 110 (5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R);  
37 See infra Part II of this paper explaining the rules of interpretation of international 
treaties. 
38 Most recently, the World Trade Organisation in the Plain Packaging Litigation 
(Australia - Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other 
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging - Panel report 
- Action by the Dispute Settlement Body WT/DS467/23, 30 August 2018) held that the 
TRIPS Agreement must be read in light of Article 8, which enables the pursuit of societal 
objectives to limit the scope of trademark protection under the Agreement. In the Plain 
Packaging litigation, the societal objective was public health. Importantly, the decision 
interpreted the World Health Organisation’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control to 
arrive at this conclusion. This has implications for the interpretation of the limitations on 
copyright and other intellectual property protection under the TRIPS Agreement in light of 
societal objectives (such as education, for instance).  
39 See Christophe Geiger, et al. ‘Max Planck declaration on a balanced interpretation of 
the “three-step test” in copyright law,’ IIC 39.6 (2008): 707-713 (outlining the regulatory 
functions of the three-step test internationally, nationally and regionally). 
40 See Part II.B of this paper for a detailed outline and analysis of this aspect of the 
Referral Letter. 
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the analysis is replicable for other human rights obligations that may be 
relevant.41 I briefly explore them below. 
1.   Right to education 
South Africa is party to the core treaties in international human rights law 
that guarantee the right to education. At the heart of the international human 
rights law framework on access to educational materials is the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which 
comprehensively guarantees the right to education.42 Upon the approval of 
Parliament, South Africa ratified the ICESCR in 2015.43 The right to 
education under the ICESCR includes access to educational materials as an 
integral part of the right.44 The various dimensions of the right to education 
                                                 
41 Since copyright restricts the free flow of literary, artistic, musical and dramatic works 
amongst others, the rights in respect of freedom of information and expression, culture (since 
cultural output across communities is expressed through literary, artistic, musical and 
dramatic works amongst others), education (since curricula rely on learning materials such 
as books, journal articles etc.), the protection of authors’ moral and material interests (since 
copyright purports to protect authors) and access to the benefits of science and technology 
(since these benefits are in the form of information that may be automatically subject to 
copyrighted), as well as the right to equality (since all people must be able to access 
copyrighted materials equally, irrespective of protected characteristics such as disability, 
race etc.) among others are all implicated. 
42 Article 13, ICESCR. South Africa is not a party to the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR. As a result, complaints by individuals or NGOs cannot be filed at the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For a commentary on Article 13, see Klaus D. 
Beiter, The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law: Including a 
Systematic Analysis of Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006). 
43 However, South Africa also deposited a declaration that ‘the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa will give progressive effect to the right to education, as provided 
for in Article 13 (2) (a) and Article 14, within the framework of its National Education Policy 
and available resources’. The declaration is controversial as it seems to derogate from the 
established position that the right to basic education is immediately realisable under South 
African law. Regardless of the reservation the right to basic education has been immediately 
realisable under the Bill of Rights since  it came into force so it is difficult to see what the 
point of the reservation might have been. However, the declaration significantly does not 
make any reservations regarding the content of the right. See Faranaaz Veriava, Right to 
Basic Education (Forthcoming, JUTA, 2019) at 48 (explaining the effect of the declaration 
and its correct interpretation in light of the obligations present in the Bill of Rights). 
44 Although “educational materials” does not find explicit mention in the text of Article 
13, its crucial role as an input in realising the right to quality education for all has been 
confirmed by various Concluding Observations of the CESCR Committee in respect of the 
right to education under Article 13. See, amongst others, Concluding Observations in respect 
of: Guinea, 30 March 2020, E/C.12/GIN/CO/1 at 47(d) (noting the lack of teaching materials 
as one of the key reasons for poor quality of education); Niger, 4 June 2018, 
E/C.12/NER/CO/1 at 58(c) (noting the lack of teaching materials as one of the key reasons 
for poor quality of education particularly in rural areas); Pakistan, 23 June 2017, 
E/C.12/PAK/CO/1 at 79(e) (linking lack of learning materials to poor quality of education); 
Burkina Faso, 12 July 2016, E/C.12/BFA/CO/1 at 49(c) (noting the lack of teaching 
materials and poor quality of education); Second Periodic Report of Honduras, 11 July 2016, 
E/C.12/HND/CO/2 at 56(c) (recommending that the state take necessary measures to allocate 
funds towards teaching materials); the Second Periodic Report of Lebanon, 24 October 2016, 
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and their corresponding obligations under the ICESCR are encapsulated by 
the 4-A framework (availability, accessibility, acceptability and 
adaptability).45 Cumulatively, this underscores the duty upon states to ensure 
that education (including educational inputs such as educational materials) is 
made accessible and available to all people and groups without 
discrimination. This entails an equality and non-discrimination enquiry, 
which South African courts have developed in much detail,46 particularly in 
respect of discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics such as 
disability47 and socio-economic status,48 for instance. Where the education in 
                                                 
E/C.12/LBN/CO/2 at 4(c) and (h) (noting the fulfilment of obligations of the state by 
distributing free textbooks and targeting and eliminating discriminatory textbooks); 
Combined second and third periodic reports of Tajikistan, 25 March 2015, 
E/C.12/TJK/CO/2-3 at 35 (noting that the lack of teaching materials is one of the reasons for 
poor quality of education); Tajikistan, 25 March 2015, E/C.12/TJK/CO/2-3 at 37 (noting the 
lack of textbooks in minority languages and recommending the state to take necessary 
measures); Montenegro, 15 December 2014, E/C.12/MNE/CO/1 at 25(b) (recommending 
that the state provide free textbooks at the primary education level); Tanzania, 13 December 
2012, E/C.12/TZA/CO/1-3 at 26 (noting that textbooks form a part of the indirect costs in 
primary education and are in any event inadequately available and recommending that the 
state take steps to improve the availability of educational materials); Turkmenistan, 13 
December 2011, E/C.12/TKM/CO/1 at 25 (noting the acute shortage of teaching materials 
and recommending that the state take measures to improve access to textbooks); the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 15 January 2008, E/C.12/MKD/CO/1 at 28, 47-8 (noting 
the lack of textbooks in minority languages, and recommending state subsidies for textbooks 
and provision of minority language textbooks); Benin, 9 June 2008, E/C.12/BEN/CO/2 at 48 
(recommending that the state take measures to fund the provision of textbooks); Hungary, 
16 January 2008, E/C.12/HUN/CO/3 at 50 (recommending that the state allocates adequate 
funding towards the free provision of textbooks for disadvantaged communities); Ukraine, 
4 January 2008, E/C.12/UKR/CO/5 at 54 (recommending that the state take special measures 
to subsidise textbooks and other educational tools for disadvantaged communities); Solomon 
Islands, 19 December 2002, E/C.12/1/Add.84 at 14 (noting the unaffordability of textbooks 
and teaching materials as a reason for inaccessibility of primary education); Republic of the 
Congo, 23 May 2000, E/C.12/1/Add.45 at 23 (noting the severe shortage of teaching 
materials and recommending the state funds teaching materials); Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, 2 December 1997, E/C.12/1/Add.21 at 27 (noting “with concern” the lack of 
teaching materials at the primary school level); Mexico, 5 January 1994, E/C.12/1993/16 at 
8 (noting with approval the state’s publication and distribution of textbooks but pointing out 
inadequacies of the governmental programme). 
45 Katarina Tomasevski, Human rights obligations: making education available, 
accessible, acceptable and adaptable, Right to Education Primers No. 3, available at: 
https://www.right-to-education.org/sites/right-to-education.org/files/resource-
attachments/Tomasevski_Primer%203.pdf (publication by the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Education, giving content to the four aspects of the obligations stemming from the right to 
education); UN Economic and Social Council, ‘General Comment No. 13: The Right to 
Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant)’ (1999) General Comment E/C.12/1999/10. at para 6. 
46 Harksen v Lane NO and Others (CCT9/97) [1997] ZACC 12; 1997 (11) BCLR 1489; 
1998 (1) SA 300. 
47 Caroline Ncube writes on the Marrakesh Treaty and equality in ‘Crucial Role of 
Library’, Pretoria News, 2015 available at: http://infojustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Caroline-Ncube-Op-ed-Marakesh-Treaty.pdf 
48 Social Justice Coalition and Others v Minister of Police and Others (EC03/2016) 
[2018] ZAWCHC 181; 2019 (4) SA 82 (WCC).  
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question is mandated to be free, ‘[b]y way of illustration, a State must […] 
fulfil (provide) the availability of education by […] providing teaching 
materials’.49 Moreover, where the education in question is not mandated to 
be free, the state bears a duty to make it affordable to all at all levels.50 This 
includes taking into account indirect costs, such as costs of educational 
materials and accessibility in respect of distance learning. In doing so, the 
state’s duty extends to ensuring that education is culturally sensitive and 
responsive to technological and societal changes.51 
 In addition, South Africa ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child in 1995, that provides for making education free and available to all 
children on the basis of equal opportunity.52 South Africa has also ratified the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2007, that 
obliges states party to realise the right of persons with disabilities to 
‘inclusive education’ without discrimination.53 Having ratified the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women in 1995, South Africa bears specific obligations in respect of 
ensuring equal access to education for women and girl children.54  South 
Africa has also ratified the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in 
Education in 2000,55 the first international instrument to extensively detail 
the content of the right to education. States party to this Convention undertake 
the obligation of promoting equality of opportunity in education and prohibit 
discrimination. South Africa has also ratified the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1998 obliging the 
state to ensure that education is free from racial prejudices and serves to 
combat racism.56  
                                                 
49 UN Economic and Social Council, ‘General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education 
(Art. 13 of the Covenant)’ (1999) General Comment E/C.12/1999/10 50. 
50 ibid. at para 6. 
51 See Klaus D Beiter, ‘Extraterritorial human rights obligations to “civilize” intellectual 
property law: Access to textbooks in Africa, copyright, and the right to education’, J World 
Intellect Prop. 2020; 23: 232– 266 at 246-251 available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jwip.12150 (for an overview of the obligations incumbent upon 
states in respect of access to educational materials under the ICESCR, both territorial and 
extra territorial). 
52 Articles 28, 29, Convention on the Rights of the Child. As with the ICESCR, South 
Africa has monitoring obligations in respect of the UNCRC, where it must deposit country 
reports with the respective human rights treaty body.  
53 Article 24, UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Moreover, since 
South Africa has ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities in 2007, individuals and NGOs may submit complaints to the CRPD 
Committee for the committee’s consideration. This is in addition to the monitoring and 
reporting obligations outlined in ibid. 
54 Article 10(c), UNCEDAW. South Africa has ratified the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 2007, 
enabling individuals and NGOs to submit individual complaints to the CEDAW Committee. 
55 ‘UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education’ 429 United Nations 
Treaty Series 93. 
56 Article 7, ICERD. South Africa has deposited a declaration pursuant to Article 14 of 
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South Africa’s regional obligations reinforce the comprehensive right to 
education at all levels outlined above. South Africa signed the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (widely known as the 
‘Children’s Charter’) in 1997 and ratified it in 2000. The Children’s Charter 
provides for a comprehensive right to education for children and obliges 
states parties to take positive steps to ensuring access to education for all 
sectors of society, particularly to those who have been structurally 
disadvantaged.57 Moreover, South Africa has ratified the African Youth 
Charter in 2009, which mandates states parties in particular, to take necessary 
steps to ensure that education is of good quality irrespective of the forms that 
it takes, and to minimise the “indirect costs” that accrue from pursuing 
education.58 South Africa has ratified the Banjul Charter in 1996,59  which 
requires states parties to ensure that every individual has access to education 
and, through teaching and education, for everyone to know their rights and 
assert them.60 
 
2.  Other human rights 
Outside of the right to education, South Africa is also party to those 
treaties protecting the right to free flow of information and freedom of 
expression. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
protects the freedom of expression including the right to “seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, 
in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of […] 
choice,” was signed by South Africa in 1994 and ratified in 1998.61 This right 
contains within it restrictions that may be imposed (1) by law, (2) if 
necessary, and only for the following specific reasons enumerated in the 
                                                 
the ICERD in 1998 enabling individuals to file complaints with the CERD Committee. 
57 It also provides for the creation of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child, which is empowered to hear complaints from individuals and non-
governmental organisations in respect of violations of children’s rights. See Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 11 July 1990, 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 
58 Article 13, African Youth Charter. As I have explained in the preceding section on 
international human rights obligations incumbent upon South Africa, textbook costs form a 
part of indirect costs.  
59 Articles 17, 25, Banjul Charter. South Africa ratified the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights (‘Banjul Charter’) in 1996, which guarantees the right to education to all 
individuals under Article 17, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul 
Charter), adopted on 27 June 1981 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), 
entered into force 21 October 1986. 
60 South Africa acceded to the Protocol to the Banjul Charter which established the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (now the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights), enabling other states parties, the African Commission, as well as inter-governmental 
bodies to bring human rights disputes against it in respect of the right to education amongst 
other rights in the Charter. South Africa has not deposited a declaration under Article 5(3) 
of the Protocol, and so complaints by individuals may not be filed. 
61 Article 19, ICCPR.  
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ICCPR: “respect of the rights or reputations of others” and “protection of 
national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or 
morals”.62 The Banjul Charter, acceded to by South Africa, also protects the 
right to receive and impart information freely as well as the freedom of 
expression.63 The African Youth Charter, ratified by South Africa, guarantees 
the right of young people to speak freely and disseminate and receive 
information – subject to existing legal frameworks.64  
South Africa is party to those treaties guaranteeing the right to cultural 
participation and development. The ICESCR particularly protects the right of 
every person to participate in cultural life65 and to enjoy the benefits of 
progress in science and technological developments.66 These benefits often 
take the form of knowledge and information, communicated through books, 
articles and other copyrighted materials. The ICESCR further qualifies the 
duties incumbent upon states parties that stem from this right, to include 
taking those steps that are necessary to conserve, develop and diffuse science 
and culture.67 The Banjul Charter, to which South Africa is party, guarantees 
the right to economic, cultural and social development to all peoples, as well 
as imposes an obligation upon states parties to ensure the exercise of this 
right.68 The African Youth Charter guarantees the same right, and qualifies 
the duty of the state to specifically encourage the widespread “production, 
exchange and dissemination of information” nationally and internationally, 
and to provide access to information for the development of young people’s 
full participation in society.69  
South Africa is party to the ICESCR which also guarantees the right of 
authors to “benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production”.70 This right has 
been explicitly distinguished from international copyright and intellectual 
property law by the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights in 
its General Comment detailing the scope, content and duties related to this 
right.71 In explaining this difference, the General Comment highlights that  
                                                 
62 Article 19 (3)(a) and (b), ICCPR. Moreover, in 2002, South Africa acceded to the 
Optional Protocol which enables individuals to file communications in respect of violations 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the state at the Human Rights 
Committee. 
63 Article 9, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
64 Article 4, African Youth Charter. 
65 Article 15(1)(a), ICESCR. 
66 Article 15(1)b), ICESCR. 
67 Article 15(2), ICESCR. 
68 Article 22, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
69 Article 10(3), African Youth Charter. 
70 Article 15(1)(c), ICESCR. 
71 CESCR, General Comment No. 17, The right of everyone to benefit from the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he or she is the author (article 15, paragraph 1(c) of the Covenant), 
E/C.12/GC/17 (12 January 2006) at 1-3, 10. 
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Whereas the human right to benefit from the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary and artistic 
productions safeguards the personal link between authors and their 
creations and between peoples, communities, or other groups and their 
collective cultural heritage, as well as their basic material interests which 
are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living, 
intellectual property regimes primarily protect business and corporate 
interests and investments.72 
In respect of the corresponding duty incumbent upon the state in giving 
effect to this right, the General Comment clarifies that the other rights present 
in the ICESCR (including the rights to education, participation in cultural life, 
benefiting from developments in science and technology) must not be 
obstructed. Further that this duty includes the obligation on the state party to 
prevent “unreasonably high costs” for accessing educational materials, 
amongst other public goods.73 The right recognised by Article 15 of ICESCR 
is a human right so unlike copyright it cannot be enjoyed by a corporation 
nor can it be transferred from or alienated by its human author. No other 
human rights treaty that South Africa is party to guarantees this right.  
 Finally, South Africa is bound by all of the above treaties to give 
effect to the above rights equally to all people and without discrimination on 
the basis of protected characteristics such as race, gender, disability amongst 
others.74 This is particularly important where certain groups experience 
relative disadvantage due to the lack of access to copyrighted materials 
thereby placing their enjoyment of the above rights in jeopardy. The 
Marrakesh VIP Treaty outlined in the previous section identifies the 
particular disadvantage that persons with visual and print disabilities 
experience in respect of accessing such materials and makes the crucial 
connection with the right to equality and non-discrimination of persons with 
disabilities as guaranteed by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities.75 
 DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA  
In order to determine the domestic effect of the above international treaty 
obligations binding on South Africa, I first outline the constitutional 
provisions on relationship between international and domestic law. I limit my 
analysis to the constitutional provisions in respect of treaties. I then turn to 
the specific effect that these provisions have on the above treaties. In my 
analysis, I explain how the Bill of Rights acts as a magnet for policy and 
interpretive choices made by all organs of state.  
                                                 
72 Ibid at 2. 
73 Ibid at 35. 
74 Preamble, Articles 2(2), 3, 13(2)(c), ICESCR; Articles 2,3,19, African Charter of 
Human and Peoples Rights; Preamble, Article 2, 10(1), 11(2)(c), 13(4)(f), 23, 24, African 
Youth Charter; Article 3, 11(3)(d), 12, Children’s Charter. 
75 Article 5, UNCRPD. South Africa has ratified the UNCRPD as mentioned previously. 
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At the outset, it is important to recall what it means for a treaty to bind 
South Africa. The consequence of South Africa being bound at international 
law is that other states may seek to hold South Africa responsible for alleged 
lack of compliance or breaches of treaty obligations in an international forum 
having jurisdiction in the matter.76 An aggrieved state would need to first 
establish on the facts that South Africa has committed an internationally 
wrongful act (breach of its international treaty obligations, for instance) and 
that this act was attributable to the state. The international forum seized with 
resolving the dispute will make a determination on this, as well as the 
implications of such a finding (in terms of reparations to the injured state in 
a state-state dispute, for instance). The exact nature of this determination will 
depend on the forum and the dispute. This may extend to individuals, in 
respect of holding South Africa responsible for the domestic fulfilment of 
their international obligations under human rights treaty bodies in the UN 
Treaty Body System. This aspect is outside the scope of the paper. Rather, I 
focus solely on the domestic legal effect of these obligations on Parliament 
in respect of legislating the CAB. 
What is the effect of these binding treaty obligations within the domestic 
South African legal system? The operation of law (and law-making) on the 
domestic plane is conditioned and constrained by the Constitution. The 
Constitution contains within it the “cornerstone of democracy” – the Bill of 
Rights.77 For this reason, the effect of treaty obligations may be categorised 
into (1) obligations that map onto the Bill of Rights, and (2) those that do not. 
This importantly does not affect the binding nature of the sum of obligations 
on the international plane. South Africa remains bound to fulfil all its 
international obligations in good faith on the basis of pacta sunt servanda.78 
Rather, in domestically implementing its international obligations, South 
Africa is required to fulfil those international obligations that map onto the 
Bill of Rights.79 This is what I term ‘the Bill of Rights as a magnet’. In respect 
of the second category of obligations, those that do not map onto the Bill of 
Rights, South Africa is permitted a wide amplitude of policy-making space 
to fulfil its obligations subject, of course, to constitutional constraints. These 
constraints include the Bill of Rights. I explain, in detail, how the provisions 
on international treaty obligations in the Constitution structures the 
relationship that international law has with domestic law in the South African 
context in the next section.  
At this stage it is important to zoom back out to the international plane. 
The effect of the above analysis is not to say that South Africa can or should, 
at any point in time, use its domestic law to justify a breach of international 
                                                 
76 As described in supra note 14.  
77 Section 7(1), Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (‘Constitution’). 
78 As described in supra note 11. 
79 Section 7(2) and 8(1), Constitution. As I will go on to show, both Glenister II and Law 
Society draw on s 7(2) to pin down the duty of the state with international obligations playing 
an interpretive role in realising the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
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obligations.80 Rather it is to acknowledge the inherently pluralistic nature of 
international obligations and international law’s ability to generate 
heterogeneous norms depending on the unique cross-regime sum of 
international obligations of a particular state.81 In other words, South Africa’s 
all-things-considered sum of binding treaty obligations may generate a 
different normative weighted outcome from say, the US or Canada.82 This 
inevitably means that international law is not implemented in the same exact 
way across the world – nor should it be,83 as international treaties are often 
the product of political consensuses and compromises, and rely on particular 
local policies for effective implementation.84 Moreover, South Africa is an 
active actor in international law-making and interpreting, and not just a 
passive recipient of international law. The implementation of international 
obligations must not be understood in a top-down manner as has been taking 
place in the discourse around the CAB’s compliance with the three-step test 
of the TRIPS Agreement, for instance (as if the meaning of the three-step test 
                                                 
80 Article 27, VCLT prohibits this. Article 46, VCLT is unlikely to be helpful as it finds 
very limited application. See Dörr, Oliver and Schmalenbach, Kristen (eds), ‘Article 27’, 
Vienna convention on the law of treaties : a commentary and ‘Article 46’ in Vienna 
convention on the law of treaties : a commentary (Second edition, Springer) for an 
explanation of the scope of Article 46 and its interaction with Article 27. 
81  See International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group, Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law: Analysis (A/CN.4/L.682) (13 April 2006) at 410-480 (outlining the 
principle of harmonization or ‘systemic integration’ – that the sum of international 
obligations incumbent upon a state at the time of interpretation is relevant and must be given 
weight – as underlying all international treaty obligations irrespective of their specialised 
nature). See also Margaret Chon,  A Rough Guide to Global Intellectual Property Pluralism 
(November 16, 2009, Seattle University School of Law Research Paper No. 09-01, Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1507343 (explaining how international intellectual 
property law contains within it heterogeneous actors and with them, heterogeneous 
possibilities) and Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The Protection of Intellectual Property in 
International Law (OUP, 2016) (particularly explaining the fragmentation of international 
law and its impact on intellectual property treaties). 
82 See Mirna Adjami, ‘African Courts, International Law, and Comparative Case-Law: 
Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence’ (2002) 24 Mich J Intl L 164 (analysing 
the different methods of interpretation of international obligations of states from national 
courts in selected African countries and highlighting the important role that local priorities 
play in particularising states’ international legal commitments). 
83 See generally Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, Between Resistance and Reform: 
TWAIL and the Universality of International Law, 3(1) Trade L. & Dev. 103 (2011) at 115-
121 (explaining the methodological shift that Third World Approaches to International Law 
articulates to recognising the problematic nature of the imposed universality of international 
law and advocating for a meaningful pluralism instead). For a comprehensive bibliography 
taking stock of this approach, see James Gathii Thuo, The Promise of International Law: A 
Third World View (June 25, 2020), Grotius Lecture Presented at the 2020 Virtual Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3635509 (cataloguing the development of these approaches from 
1996-2019). 
84 See for example, Dinah Shelton (ed), International Law and Domestic Legal Systems: 
Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (OUP 2011).  
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is static and pre-determined).85 In other words, the meaning of international 
obligations must first be determined before they are implemented on the 
domestic plane,86 or alleged to be violated by another state in an international 
tribunal. This ‘auto interpretation’ of international law, recognises that states 
themselves are actors in interpreting international law,87 in order to 
determine its domestic legal effect. 
 Determining the meaning of a treaty provision 
In determining the meaning of international treaty obligations, the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) posits certain rules of 
interpretation that have been widely considered to be customary international 
law.88 Rules of customary international law bind all states, as long as the 
ingredients of custom are satisfied – that there is evidence of widespread state 
practice and opinio juris, that is that states are acting in furtherance of this 
norm with the intention to be bound.89 Since these rules apply to all states, in 
                                                 
85 See particularly in the area of international copyright law, Martin Skladany, 
Copyright’s Arc (CUP 2020) (explicitly rejecting a one-size-fits all approach to copyright 
law and exceptions and limitations, and outlining the impact that strict copyright regimes has 
on human rights fulfilment in developing countries). See Andre Myburgh, Advice on the 
Copyright Amendment Bill to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, 1 October 
2018, on file with author (for an instance of top-down, one-size-fits all approach to the three-
step test to the CAB without taking into account any other international obligations or 
domestic priorities). See also Jonathan Band, Analysis of Woods and Myburgh Comments on 
CAB, (2020), Joint PIJIP/TLS Research Paper Series. 55. 
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/55 (in any event, disproving Woods and 
Myburgh’s contention of CAB’s incompatibility with IP treaties on their own terms).  
86 See Dire Tladi, ‘Interpretation and international law in South African courts: The 
Supreme Court of Appeal and the Al Bashir saga’ (2016) 16  African Human Rights Law 
Journal 310-338 at 311 (explaining the correct methodology of interpretation of international 
law in the South African context). 
87 See André Nollkaemper, ‘Grounds for the Application of International Rules of 
Interpretation in National Courts’ in Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The 
Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts (Oxford University Press 2016). At 
35 (analysing how domestic auto interpretation of international law influences the content of 
international law); See also Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs, ‘The Impact of Domestic 
Politics on Global Fragmentation’ in Between Fragmentation and Democracy (CUP 2017) 
at 56-65 (explaining the significant role that domestic courts play in resolving the 
fragmentation of international law). 
88Dörr, Oliver and Schmalenbach, Kristen (eds), ‘Article 31’, Vienna convention on the 
law of treaties : a commentary (Second edition, Springer); Dörr, Oliver and Schmalenbach, 
Kristen (eds), ‘Article 32’, Vienna convention on the law of treaties : a commentary (Second 
edition, Springer). In addition, the ICJ has repeatedly held that the interpretation provisions 
of the VCLT are customary international law. See, for a sample of these cases: ICJ Arbitral 
Award of 31 July 1989 (Judgment) [1991] ICJ Rep 53 at para 48; Kasikili Sedudu Island 
(Botswana v Namibia) [1999] ICJ Rep 1045 at para 18; Application  of  the  Convention  on  
the  Prevention  and Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide  (Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  v  
Serbia  and  Montenegro) 26 February  2007 at para  16; Commentary to Conclusion One of 
the ILC’s Draft Conclusion on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation 
to Interpretation of Treaties, Chapter IV of the ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its Fifty-Sixth 
Session’ (2013) at para 4. 
89 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; 
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practice, state organs (and other entities whose acts are attributable to the 
state) would be charged with employing these rules to interpret the breadth 
of treaty obligations so that they may domestically act in a way that enables 
the performance of states’ obligations internationally. The exact contours of 
the domestic effect of this obligation is determined by the domestic law of 
that state.  
Rules of customary international law are considered to be “law in the 
Republic” directly, without the need for any additional legislative step.90 Any 
organ of state, when interpreting international treaties, must apply the VCLT 
rules of interpretation to determine the meaning of international treaty 
obligations – since such rules are to be treated as domestic law applicable in 
the circumstances.91  
What are these rules? The VCLT rules of interpretation are fairly 
straightforward – that treaty provisions must be interpreted using the text, 
surrounding context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty.92 This 
overlaps substantially with existing domestic law on statutory and 
constitutional interpretation.93 The VCLT defines context to include those 
treaties that have been concluded in connection with the treaty in question.94 
Along with the context, the VCLT requires the interpreter to take into account 
subsequent agreements regarding the interpretation and application of the 
treaty,95 the domestic implementation of states parties to the treaty in the form 
of subsequent practice,96 as well as the development of other international 
law norms that may be relevant in the circumstances.97 The pluralistic 
meanings of international treaties are thus, in part, created by the varied 
                                                 
Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands) , I.C.J. Reports 1969 at p.3, International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), 20 February 1969 contains a widely accepted statement on the ingredients 
of customary international law. 
90 Section 232, Constitution. 
91 Dire Tladi, ‘Interpretation of Treaties in an International Law-Friendly Framework’ 
in Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation of International Law by 
Domestic Courts (Oxford University Press 2016). At 140 (analysing how South African 
courts have interpreted international law). 
92 Article 31(1), VCLT. 
93 Supra note 86 at 141. See also Lourens du Plessis, Interpretation in Woolman & 
Bishop, Constitutional Law of South Africa, available at: 
https://constitutionallawofsouthafrica.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Chap32.pdf 
(providing an in-depth overview of constitutional interpretation in South Africa). See also, 
Michael Bishop and Jason Brickhill, ‘In the beginning was the word' : the role of text in the 
interpretation of statutes’, South African Law Journal, Volume 129, Issue 4, Nov 2012, p. 
681 – 716 (explaining the constitutionally appropriate weight that must be given to the text 
of statutes in their interpretation). In any event, to the extent that these rules are different 
from existing statutory and constitutional rules of interpretation, they form a part of 
customary international law and are hence applicable at the level of domestic law. 
94 Article 31(2), VCLT. 
95 Article 31(3)(a), VCLT. 
96 Article 31(3)(b), VCLT. 
97 Article 31(3)(c), VCLT. 
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domestic interpretations and implementation of states parties to the treaty.98 
In other words, South Africa is a powerful actor who not only takes part in 
creating international treaties through the process of negotiation and adoption 
of treaties, but also contributes to constituting the meanings of treaties 
through its manner of interpreting them, and giving domestic effect to them 
as a reflection of its own socio-economic realities.99 The CAB, as this paper 
goes on to show, is an instance of just that.  
 Constitutional treatment of treaty obligations 
What are the ways in which South Africa may domestically give effect to 
treaty obligations? Where does the CAB fit in this analysis? The 
constitutional treatment of the above listed copyright and international human 
rights binding treaty obligations provide some answers. South Africa follows 
a hybrid system in respect of its international obligations – partly monist,100 
(i.e., the constitutional provisions on customary international law)101 and 
partly dualist,102 (i.e., the provisions on treaties, that I go on to discuss).103 
Constitutionally speaking, this means that treaties do not have any automatic, 
direct effect on domestic law except for certain circumstances outlined 
below. 
 There are three ways in which binding treaty obligations create 
domestic legal effects for South Africa: first, through legislation by 
Parliament; second, directly, through self-executing provisions of treaties 
approved by Parliament; and third, through the creation of a normative 
universe for the application of interpretive injunctions guiding courts to (1) 
prefer a reasonable interpretation of domestic legislation that is in accordance 
with international law over one that is not, as well as the injunction to (2) take 
into account international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights. I go on to 
                                                 
98 See Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Judicial Dialogue as a Means of Interpretation’ in 
Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation of International Law by 
Domestic Courts (Oxford University Press 2016). (explaining the role of domestic courts in 
international meaning-making) 
99 Dire Tladi, Interpretation and international law in South African courts: The Supreme 
Court of Appeal and the Al Bashir saga’ (2016) 16 
African Human Rights Law Journal 310-338 (making the point that in the Al Bashir case, 
the Supreme Court of Appeals in South Africa incorrectly underestimates its role in 
international legal meaning-making by asserting that only international adjudicatory bodies 
like the ICJ can contribute to changing customary international law). 
100 Where international law and domestic law are treated as a part of the same system, 
i.e., international law is directly applicable without any steps taken in domestic law.  
101 Section 232, Constitution. 
102 Where an additional step is required for international law to be applicable within 
domestic systems of law.  
103 See G Ferreira and A Ferreira-Snyman, The incorporation of public international law 
into municipal law and regional law against the background of the dichotomy between 
monism and dualism, (2014) PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad, 17(4), 1471-
1496 (explaining the distinction between monism and dualism and South Africa’s hybrid 
position as outlined by the Constitution). 
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explain the constitutional scheme in s 231 below. 
Section 231 reads as follows: 
231. (1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the 
responsibility of the national executive. 
(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been 
approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection 
(3). 
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive 
nature, or an agreement which does not require either ratification or 
accession, entered into by the national executive, binds the Republic 
without approval by the National Assembly and the National Council of 
Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly and the Council within a 
reasonable time. 
(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is 
enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of 
an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic 
unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. 
(5) The Republic is bound by international agreements which were 
binding on the Republic when this Constitution took effect. 
 
Section 231 recognises the central role of Parliament in fulfilling 
domestic conditions for South Africa to be internationally bound by treaties. 
There are two roles outlined for Parliament: first, approving South Africa’s 
accession/ratification to a treaty as a condition precedent for the executive to 
deposit the relevant international instrument (s 231(2)), thereby enabling the 
treaty to bind South Africa internationally (where the treaty requires 
ratification); second, in respect of ‘technical, administrative or executive’ 
treaties that do not require accession/ratification and that have already been 
signed by the executive, Parliament plays a confirmatory role – s 231(3) 
mandates that such treaties be tabled before Parliament within a reasonable 
amount of time, after it has been signed.104 In respect of treaties that already 
bound South Africa before the commencement of the Constitution of South 
Africa, 1996, the constitutional scheme provides for their continuance in s 
231(5).  
According to the constitutional scheme, s 231(4) provides for only two 
circumstances when the treaties in ss 231(2) and 231(3) can create directly 
applicable domestically enforceable obligations within South Africa. These 
are: first, where Parliament has ‘domestically incorporated’ any treaty105 
                                                 
104 This explanation is derived from J Dugard & A Coutsoudis ‘The Place of 
International Law in South African Municipal Law’ in J Dugard, M Du Plessis, T Maluwa 
& D Tladi (eds) Dugard’s International Law: A South African Perspective (2019) 74-81. 
105 Ibid at 83. 
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(from either category listed above – ss 231(2) or (3)), by enacting national 
legislation to give effect to it; and second, where certain provisions of treaties 
approved by Parliament under s 231(2) do not require additional legislation 
and are thus directly applicable (self-executing) as long as they are consistent 
with the Constitution and existing domestic law.106 The consequence of 
incorporation of treaties under s 231(4) is that after the enactment of domestic 
legislation, the international agreement, to the extent that it is incorporated in 
domestic legislation, creates rights and obligations enforceable within 
domestic courts as ordinary domestic law.107  
Within the scheme of s 231, this means that the treaties that exist outside 
of the subset of s 231(4) and within ss 231(2), (3) and (5) are internationally 
binding upon South Africa but do not form an independent source of rights 
and obligations for domestic enforcement. As I go on to show, their domestic 
legal effect is interpretive. 
The interpretive injunctions are of two types. First, that courts are obliged 
to prefer an interpretation of a law that is consistent with customary 
international law108 and South Africa’s consolidated sum of binding 
international treaty obligations under ss 231(2), (3) and (5),109 as long as this 
is a reasonable interpretation of that legislation.110 Second, that international 
law, must be considered by any ‘court, tribunal or forum’ seeking to interpret 
the Bill of Rights.111 What does international law in this context mean? The 
Constitutional Court has held that ‘international law’ in terms of s 39(1)(b) 
includes both binding as well as non-binding international law.112 The 
obligation is not for courts to interpret the Bill of Rights consistently with all 
                                                 
106 The Constitutional Court had an opportunity to interpret the scope of self-executing 
treaties in President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Quagliani [2009] ZACC 
1, 2009 (4) BCLR 345 (CC), 2009 (2) SA 466 (CC) but chose not to do so. Rather the Court 
held that pre-existing Extradition Act formed “anticipatory enactment” of the Extradition 
Agreement between South Africa and the US. See, for a critique, N Botha ‘Rewriting the 
Constitution: The ‘‘strange alchemy’’ of Justice Sachs, indeed!’, (2009) 34 South African 
Yearbook of International Law 253 (critiquing the judgment in Quagliani on the grounds of 
its missed opportunity to clarify the content and scope of self-executing treaties). 
107 Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others [1996] ZACC 16; 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC); 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 
(CC) at 26. 
108 Provided that such customary international law is consistent with the Constitution 
and existing domestic law as per s 232, Constitution. 
109 Andreas Coutsoudis and Max du Plessis, ‘We are all international lawyers now: the 
Constitution’s international law trifecta comes of age’, South African Law Journal, Volume 
136 Number 3, 2019, p. 433 - 462 at 438. 
110 Section 233 reads as follows: “when interpreting any legislation, every court must 
prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law 
over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.”   
111 Section 39(1) reads as follows: “(1)When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum— (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) 
may consider foreign law.”  
112 S v Makwanyane [1995] ZACC 3, 1995 (3) SA 391 at 35 discusses the analogous s 
35(1) of the Interim Constitution. 
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binding and non-binding international law – rather, it is to consider all 
international law. This is distinct from s 233’s interpretive injunction which 
obliges courts to prefer a reasonable interpretation of legislation that complies 
with binding international law.113 In other words, the treaties in ss 231(2), (3) 
and (5) that are neither self-executing nor domestically incorporated under s 
231(4), form the normative frame within which courts must interpret 
legislation.114 Legislation must be interpreted to be within the normative 
frame described above. 
 
   BILL OF RIGHTS AS A MAGNET: THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE TO 
GIVE GREATER NORMATIVE WEIGHT TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
Human rights treaties, as listed in the previous section, to the extent that 
they map onto the Bill of Rights, have a greater normative imperative to be 
given effect to by Parliament and courts as opposed to treaties that do not 
map onto the Bill of Rights.115 In essence, the Bill of Rights acts as a magnet 
for South Africa’s binding international obligations. This is due to the 
Constitution’s foregrounding of the Bill of Rights. CAB is an instance of 
Parliament taking this normative imperative seriously and should be 
recognised as such in respect of the relevant binding international human 
rights treaties. I go on to establish this below.  
   Courts and international human rights law 
I deal with the obligation on courts first. How should courts apply human 
rights treaties? The interpretive propositions that emerged from the previous 
section are: (1) that in interpreting domestic law, courts are enjoined to 
choose an interpretation of legislation that is consistent with binding 
international law provided that it is a reasonable interpretation and (2) that in 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, courts are enjoined to consider international 
law, binding and non-binding. How then, should courts treat those binding 
treaties that map onto the Bill of Rights?  
To answer this question, a third proposition is helpful:  
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law 
or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
                                                 
113 S v Okah 2018 (4) BCLR 456 (CC); 2018 (1) SACR 492 (CC) at 38. This 
interpretation was recently reiterated by Law Society at 5. 
114 Along with relevant rules of customary international law – but this aspect is not 
relevant to the current enquiry and hence outside the scope of this paper. 
115 For the full repertoire of constitutional opportunities available to Parliament to give 
effect to international human rights law, see Lilian Chenwi ‘Using International Human 
Rights Law to Promote Constitutional Rights: The (Potential) Role of the South African 
Parliament’ (2011) 15 Law, Democracy and Development 314 (outlining the various roles 
that international human rights law can play in Parliament’s law-making including the one I 
have outlined in this paper). 
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purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.116 
Courts have held repeatedly that when interpreting legislation, courts are 
enjoined to prefer the most constitutional interpretation – to select an 
interpretation of the domestic law that best complies with the Constitution 
and promotes the Bill of Rights.117  
How do all three propositions fit together for the purposes of a court 
charged with interpreting the CAB against the international obligations that 
South Africa has undertaken in respect of copyright and human rights? Courts 
must first consider the range of reasonable interpretations that are available 
to them on the basis of the text of CAB. Then, they must map and determine 
the meaning of the international law that binds South Africa using the VCLT 
rules of interpretation, in order to apply s 233 and prefer the interpretation 
most consistent with binding international law. In the process of this enquiry, 
where binding international law maps onto the Bill of Rights, typically in 
respect of those international human rights treaties that South Africa has 
acceded to/ratified under s 231(2), (3) and (5), courts are doubly enjoined by 
s 233 and s 39(2), to prefer an interpretation that best promotes the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.118  
   Parliament and international human rights law 
I now turn to the obligations incumbent upon Parliament. Apart from 
fulfilling constitutional pre and post conditions for international treaty 
obligations to bind South Africa domestically, what role, if any, does the 
Constitution envision for international law to play in Parliament’s law-
making process? Does it matter if the obligations at issue are international 
human rights obligations? The Constitution provides for Parliament’s law-
making process to be triggered by the domestic incorporation of international 
treaties under s 231(4).119 This is where Parliament determines whether 
additional legislation is necessary to make a binding international treaty 
enforceable in South African courts. In practice, in the course of carrying out 
the process of approval for those treaties before it that have been signed but 
not yet ratified / acceded, Parliament surveys the existing corpus of domestic 
law and triggers its law-making process if it deems necessary. In respect of 
CAB, the inadequacy of the domestic legal framework in addressing the lack 
of access of copyright materials to persons with disabilities was one of the 
reasons for the Bill, to bring South African law in line with the 2013 
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who 
                                                 
116 Section 39(2), Constitution.   
117 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
Smit NO and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at 22; Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) 
Ltd and Another [2008] ZACC 12; 2009 (1) SA 337 (CC); 2008 (11) BCLR 1123 (CC) at 
45; Fraser v Absa Bank Ltd [2006] ZACC 24; 2007 (3) BCLR 219 (CC); 2007 (3) SA 484 
(CC) at 43. 
118 See Part II.A & B of the paper.  
119 See Part II.A & B of the paper. 
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Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled before South 
Africa could ratify it.120  
The Constitution importantly provides for certain substantive constraints 
on Parliament’s operation. This is a deliberate shift from parliamentary 
sovereignty to constitutional supremacy, moving into the democratic era.121 
Primarily, that Parliament’s legislative authority is limited by the 
Constitution – Parliament’s law-making power must be discharged at all 
times within the limits imposed by the Constitution.122 There are a number of 
procedural and substantive constraints on Parliament’s law-making power.123 
For the purposes of this paper, one of the key limitations on Parliament’s law-
making power is the Bill of Rights.124 There are three ways in which the Bill 
of Rights frames Parliament’s law-making power – first, through the general 
obligation upon Parliament to bring apartheid-era legislation in line with the 
Constitution and particularly the Bill of Rights; second through s 36, which 
states that no law of general application can infringe a right in the Bill of 
Rights, and in the event that it does, in order for the law to be constitutionally 
valid, it must fulfil the test that s 36 lays out; and third, through ss 7(2) and 
8(1) of the Constitution that enjoin all organs of state to ‘respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil’ the rights in the Bill of Rights.   
Turning to the first, Parliament has a general obligation recognised by 
courts, to bring apartheid-era laws in line with the Bill of Rights.125 Courts 
have held that the history and context behind a law that was enacted during 
apartheid cannot be ignored in interpreting it.126  Further, the Constitutional 
Court has recently applied the two-stage rubric through which laws are tested 
for consistency with the constitutional framework to apartheid-era laws as 
                                                 
120 Closing Statement by South Africa, WIPO Diplomatic Conference, available at: 
https://libguides.wits.ac.za/ld.php?content_id=5267475 See also, the Memorandum on the 
Objects of the Copyright Amendment Bill, 1.1-1.3 available at: 
https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/uploaded-
files/Copyright%20Amendment%20Bill%20Draft.pdf  
121 See generally Frank Michelman, The Rule of Law, Legality and the Supremacy of 
the Constitution in Woolman & Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa available at: 
https://constitutionallawofsouthafrica.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Chap11.pdf 
(outlining the supremacy of the Constitution as a rule and a value). 
122 Section 44(4), Constitution.  
123 See Michael Bishop & Ngwako Raboshakga, National Legislative Authority in 
Woolman & Bishop, Constitutional Law of South Africa (substantive constraints from 38-
63, procedural constraints from 64-92) available at 
https://constitutionallawofsouthafrica.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Chap17.pdf 
(outlining the constitutional constraints on Parliament) 
124 Ibid at 39. 
125 See generally Holomisa v Holomisa [2018] ZACC 40; 2019 (2) BCLR 247 (CC); 
Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs [2004] ZACC 19; 2005 (3) SA 
589 (CC); 2005 (4) BCLR 347 (CC) Ngcobo J at para 36.  
126 Western Cape Provincial Government: In re DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West 
Provincial Government [2000] ZACC 2; 2001 (1) SA 500 (CC); 2000 (4) BCLR 347 (CC) 
at 40. 
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well:127 first, the law in question must be interpreted to determine its meaning 
(in light of its historical context as suggested above) and second, the law must 
be tested against the specific provisions of the Constitution that it is alleged 
to violate.128 If the provisions that are infringed / threatened to be infringed 
are rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights, in addition to meeting the tests 
internal to specific rights, a s 36 limitations analysis must be carried out to 
establish whether the law is a justifiable limitation on the rights at issue. In 
passing the CAB, Parliament has taken steps to bring South Africa’s 
copyright law in line with the Bill of Rights. The CAB contains certain 
provisions that particularly enable the fulfilment of the rights in the Bill of 
Rights that were not previously fulfilled or even contemplated under the 
Copyright Act. I return to how, in particular respect of the right to access 
educational materials, (1) the apartheid-era Copyright Act 98 of 1978 is 
unconstitutional and (2) the CAB seeks to make amendments to enable the 
state to fulfil its duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the right to basic 
and higher education in the Bill of Rights.  
Moving to the second, the implications of s 36 for Parliament are that in 
carrying out its law-making function, Parliament must determine whether the 
law in question limits any right in the Bill of Rights. If such a limitation 
appears to have taken place, then s 36 provides a set of factors for Parliament 
to employ in an all-things-considered enquiry in assessing whether such a law 
would nevertheless be justifiable and likely to pass constitutional muster.129 
In order for Parliament to make such an assessment, the first step would be a 
determination of the rights that could possibly be affected. Courts have 
confirmed that international human rights law plays an important role in 
determining the scope at times,130 and often the content of rights in the Bill 
of Rights.131 In addition, international law plays a role in Parliament’s 
consideration of the factors in s 36 – particularly interpreting ‘reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
                                                 
127 Herbert N.O. and Others v Senqu Municipality [2019] ZACC 31; 2019 (11) BCLR 
1343 (CC); 2019 (6) SA 231 (CC). 
128 Ibid at 21-2. 
129 Section 36 reads as follows: “(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only 
in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including— (a) the nature of the right; (b) the 
importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) 
the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve 
the purpose. (2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the 
Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.” See the 
Constitutional Court’s approaches to interpreting s 36 in both judgments in S v Manamela 
and Another (Director-General of Justice Intervening) [2000] ZACC 5; 2000 (3) SA 1; 2000 
(5) BCLR 491. 
130 Law Society in respect of extending the scope of s 34 from domestic to international 
courts at para 29. 
131 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 
[2000] ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46; 2000 (11) BCLR 1169. 
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equality and freedom’ with respect to the limiting legislation.132  
Moreover, the third constraint that Parliament is bound by are ss 7(2) and 
8(1) which state that ‘[t]he state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights’ and ‘[t]he Bill of Rights applies to all law, and 
binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state’ 
respectively. The Constitutional Court has recently held that the proper 
exercise of the President’s powers was ‘inextricably connected’ to the 
fulfilment of the obligation present in s 7(2) read with s 8(1) to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.133 This would apply 
to Parliament as well, by virtue of the fact that it is an organ of state. 
The Glenister II case has influenced the interpretation of these 
provisions.134 In Glenister II, the Court had to determine first, whether a 
constitutional and international legal obligation existed for the state to create 
an anti-corruption unit; second, whether the new anti-corruption unit (Hawks) 
that was formed by the South African government (after its dissolution of the 
Scorpions) was sufficiently independent.135 The majority decision of the 
Court held, in response to the first question, that although the treaty to which 
South Africa was party (United Nations Convention Against Corruption) was 
not domesticated under section 231(4), there existed an independent 
constitutional obligation upon the state to create an anti-corruption unit.136 
The obligation was sourced in s 7(2) and its application determined by s 8(1) 
of the Constitution. In defining the content of that obligation, the Court 
interpreted ‘international law’ in section 39(1)(b) to consist of the ‘inter-
locking grid of conventions, agreements and protocols…set out earlier’137 
that South Africa had ratified (pursuant to the procedure laid out in s 231(2)), 
and held that these, taken together, obliged the state to establish an anti-
corruption unit that was sufficiently independent. Although the majority and 
main judgments differed on the outcome, they agreed that the effect of s 
39(1)(b) and 233 read along with ss 7(2) and 8(1) created a constitutional 
obligation on all organs of the state to comply with South Africa’s 
international obligations under s 231(2) that map onto the Bill of Rights in 
order to fight corruption.138 The degree and extent of that obligation was once 
                                                 
132 See also Stu Woolman & Henk Botha, Limitations in Constitutional Law of South 
Africa at 114 available at: https://constitutionallawofsouthafrica.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Chap34.pdf (providing an interpretation of the various factors in 
the limitations analysis under s 36). 
133 Law Society at para 78. 
134 There is a proliferation of literature on the various aspects of the Glenister II decision. 
A small sample of the literature is cited here: MD Stubbs ‘Three-Level Games: Thoughts on 
Glenister, Scaw and International Law’ (2011) 4 Constitutional Court Review 137; J 
Tuovinen ‘What to Do with International Law? Three Flaws in Glenister’ (2013) 5 
Constitutional Court Review 435; B Meyersfeld, Domesticating International Standards: The 
Direction of International Human Rights Law in South Africa [2015] 16 CCR 399. 
135 Glenister II at 163. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Glenister II at 192. 
138 Ngcobo J in Glenister II at 97; majority at 189-202. See also, Max du Plessis and 
THE DOMESTIC EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
 
SANYA.SAMTANI@LAW.OX.AC.UK 
29   
again a bone of contention between the majority and main judgments. Whilst 
the majority judgment held that the obligation mandated a specific course of 
action - to create an independent anti-corruption mechanism – the main 
judgment was of the view that the constitutional obligation was more general, 
in that ‘[t]he Constitution is not prescriptive, however, as to the specific 
mechanisms through which corruption must be rooted out, and does not 
explicitly require the establishment of an independent anti-corruption 
unit.’139 
What this means is that Parliament too, as an organ of state, must function 
not only in compliance with the Bill of Rights, but actively to protect, promote 
and fulfil the entrenched rights.140 Where international human rights 
obligations that bind South Africa under s 231(2) map onto the Bill of Rights, 
they assist in filling out the content of the obligation to some extent. It is at 
this point that the policy options available to Parliament are engaged. As long 
as Parliament acts in the above fashion, to ‘respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil’ the Bill of Rights in its law-making process and legislation, it has a 
vast array of policy choices available before it.141 In other words, as long as 
Parliament’s  
The Constitution, as discussed above, obliges courts to consider 
international law both binding and non-binding in interpreting the rights in 
the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the Constitution obliges courts to interpret all 
legislation to promote the spirit, object and purport of the Bill of Rights. The 
Constitution also requires that a reasonable interpretation of legislation that 
is consistent with binding international law is to be preferred over one that is 
inconsistent. Despite the fact that these interpretive injunctions are directed 
at courts, it is important to note that the Constitutional Court has confirmed 
that the interpretation of constitutional provisions is a shared meaning-
making exercise across the organs of state as well as those seeking to interpret 
the Constitution in law schools, the legal profession, as well as the general 
public, amongst others.142 Put differently, it would be absurd for courts to 
                                                 
Stuart Scott ‘The World’s Law and South African Domestic Courts: The Role of 
International Law in Public Interest Litigation’ in Jason Brickhill (ed) Public Interest 
Litigation in South Africa, (JUTA, 2018) 77 (giving an account of the Glenister II decision 
and its role in adding content to ss 7(2) and 8(1)). 
139 Ngcobo J in Ibid at 84. 
140 This is uncontroversial – some examples of the Constitutional Court upholding this 
proposition are: National Education Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU) v 
University of Cape Town [2002] ZACC 27, 2003 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 14; J & Another v Director 
General, Department of Home Affairs 2003 (5) BCLR 463 (CC), [2003] ZACC 3, 2003 (5) 
SA 62 (CC) at 25. 
141 This is a widely accepted proposition – some examples of the Constitutional Court 
upholding it are: S v Manamela and Another (Director-General of Justice Intervening) 
[2000] ZACC 5; 2000 (3) SA 1; 2000 (5) BCLR 491 at 34; S v Baloyi [1999] ZACC 19, 2000 
(2) SA 425 (CC), 2000 (1) BCLR 86 (CC) at 30; Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute 
for Crime Prevention and the Re-integration of Offenders (NICRO) [2004] ZACC 10 2005, 
(3) SA 280 (CC), 2004 (5) BCLR (CC) at 35. 
142 S v Mhlungu at 81; NEHAWU v University of Cape Town 2003 (3) SA 1 (CC), 2003 
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construe the content of a right in the Bill of Rights differently from 
Parliament. 
Since the text of a statute serves as the starting point143 and ‘vital 
constraint’ for statutory interpretation,144 Parliament is under a constitutional 
imperative to draft text that can support an interpretation consistent with the 
above propositions. In other words, the Bill of Rights acts as a constitutional 
magnet for Parliament’s policy choices – where binding international human 
rights obligations under s 231(2) map onto the Bill of Rights, Parliament is 
bound by ss 7(2) and 8(1) to legislate to respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
these rights, unless it can justify that these rights be limited under s 36. 
However, within this frame, courts have been careful to protect Parliament’s 
wide berth in making policy decisions and drafting legislation as outlined 
above. 
1. Constitutional constraints on Parliament’s law-making latitude 
Upon distilling the propositions established above, the constitutional 
frame within which Parliament’s law making power must be properly 
exercised is as follows: 
(1) Parliament is constitutionally required to make policy choices and 
draft legislation that gives effect to the Bill of Rights; 
(2) Where South Africa’s binding international human rights obligations 
map onto the Bill of Rights, they must be considered in interpreting 
the content of the rights in the Bill of Rights that must be given effect 
to in (1), thereby doubling the normative imperative upon Parliament 
to not only legislate consistently with binding international human 
rights obligations but to give effect to them via the Bill of Rights; 
(3) Parliament is constitutionally prohibited from limiting any right in the 
Bill of Rights unless Parliament is able to demonstrate that the test in 
s 36 to limit a right in the Bill of Rights is met;  
(4) Parliament is constitutionally permitted to enact domestic legislation 
to give effect to South Africa’s binding international obligations 
subject to (1), (2) and (3).  
There is thus a key difference in the constitutional constraints on 
Parliament’s law-making functions in respect of binding international human 
                                                 
(2) BCLR 154 (CC) at 14. 
143 Diener N.O. v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services [2018] ZACC 48; 2019 
(4) SA 374 (CC); 2019 (2) BCLR 214 (CC) at 37; Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd [2011] 
ZACC 3; 2011 (3) SA 237 (CC); 2011 (5) BCLR 453 (CC) at 70. See also Bishop and 
Brickhill, “‘In The Beginning Was The Word’: The Role of Text in the Interpretation of 
Statutes” (2012) 129 SALJ 681 at 697-8. 
144 Chisuse v Director-General, Department of Home Affairs  [2020] ZACC 20 (22 July 
2020) at 47; Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard [2014] ZACC 16; 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC); 2014 
(8) BCLR 869 (CC) at 28; SATAWU v Garvas [2012] ZACC 13; 2013 (1) SA 83 (CC); 2012 
(8) BCLR 840 (CC) at 37. 
THE DOMESTIC EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
 
SANYA.SAMTANI@LAW.OX.AC.UK 
31   
rights obligations that map onto the Bill of Rights and binding obligations 
that are not human rights obligations or that do not map onto the Bill of 
Rights. 
   INTERNATIONAL LAW AS TREATED BY THE PRESIDENT’S REFERRAL 
LETTER 
In this section, I parse the President’s concern regarding the CAB’s 
compliance with international law in his referral letter that returned the CAB 
back to the National Assembly. The letter outlines two allegations of non-
compliance of CAB with international law: first, in respect of treaties that 
South Africa has signed but not yet ratified (the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty and the Marrakesh VIP Treaty), and 
second, in respect of treaties that are already binding upon South Africa in 
terms of s 231(2) (references to the three-step test, that is present in the Berne 
Convention, to which South Africa has acceded).145  
In respect of the first allegation, the President identifies three treaties (as 
discussed in my first section) which South Africa has signed and is in the 
process of ratifying. Parliamentary approval, as discussed earlier in this 
section, is a domestic constitutional precondition that South Africa must fulfil 
in order to take the next step, of depositing instruments of ratification to be 
internationally bound in respect of these treaties. What does approval entail? 
Parliament has wide breadth to determine whether existing laws contain 
provisions that can be reasonably interpreted to be consistent with the 
international treaties in question, and if not, then to legislate to enable such 
consistency. The threshold for South Africa to give effect to its international 
obligations is not the incorporation of all provisions of the treaty into 
domestic law – s 231(4) enables Parliament to make a choice to do so in cases 
where it deems such domestication necessary. It is left to the independent 
judgment of Parliament, on the basis of the principle of separation of powers 
inherent in s 231,146 to decide whether and how binding international treaty 
obligations are to be domestically implemented.147 I go on to examine the 
decision Parliament has made at the end of this section. Parliament must then 
signal its approval, through the passing of a resolution, indicating that the 
executive may take the next step of depositing the instrument of ratification. 
On the substantive issues, the President’s concerns in the referral letter in 
respect of the CAB’s compliance with the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty and Marrakesh VIP Treaty are framed 
in extremely broad terms.148 The letter states that “it is not clear that the Bills 
                                                 
145 The letter incorrectly classifies this as a s 231(5) treaty but that does not change its 
domestic effect.  
146 As confirmed by Ngcobo J in Glenister II at 89. 
147 F Sucker ‘Approval of an International Treaty in Parliament: How does Section 
231(2) “Bind the Republic”?’ (2013) 5 Constitutional Court Review 417 at 427 (explaining 
the domestic legal effect of treaties under s 231(2) of the South African Constitution). 
148 Referral letter para 21. 
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appropriately consider the [economic] implications […] in this regard 
[economic rights of performers] of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty”,149 and in respect of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty, the referral letter states that certain exceptions and 
limitations (ss12A-D, 19B and 19C) may be “in conflict” with these treaties. 
In respect of the Marrakesh Treaty, the referral letter outlines that the same 
exceptions and limitations do not comply with the version of the three-step 
test that appears in the treaty.150 
In respect of the second set of treaties, the President states that “there is 
also a contention that the Copyright Bill breaches the three-step test” as 
present within the Berne Convention and the Marrakesh Treaty.151 This 
concern is raised in respect of the same exceptions listed above (ss12A-D, 
19B and 19C). The mechanics of South Africa’s accession to the Berne 
Convention (in part through its accession to the TRIPS Agreement) is 
explained in the first section of this paper. In short, South Africa is bound 
both domestically and internationally by the substantive provisions of the 
Berne Convention (Articles 1-21) under s 231(2).152 This includes the 
provisions on the three-step test.  
 The two allegations outlined above must be dealt with slightly 
differently. The first speaks to treaties that are not (yet) binding on South 
Africa but that South Africa seeks to bind itself to by fulfilling the 
requirements under s 231(2) (and further, s 231(4)) through the current 
process. The second speaks to existing binding international obligations 
under s 231(2) and their application to Parliament’s law-making process. 
However, it is important to first deal with the question of the scope of the 
Presidential referral. Is compliance with international law (as outlined by 
both allegations above) in the President’s referral letter a ground in and of 
itself for returning the CAB to Parliament under s 79(1) of the Constitution? 
In other words, does an enquiry into the constitutionality of a Bill include 
compliance with international law as an independent ground?  
Section 79(1) of the Constitution, which empowers the President to send 
Bills back to the National Assembly, confines this power to circumstances 
where the President may have “reservations about the constitutionality of the 
Bill”. Constitutionality is a corollary of the principle of constitutional 
supremacy – that all law must be consistent with the Constitution.153 At what 
stage, if at all, does international law enter the constitutionality inquiry? To 
answer this question, a closer look at the Constitution’s provisions on 
                                                 
149 Referral letter para 18. 
150 Referral letter paras 19-20. 
151 Referral letter para 15.1 [sic]. 
152 Rather than s 231(5) as stated in the President’s referral letter – but both categories 
of treaties have the same domestic effect so its (mis)classification does have any domestic 
effect. 
153 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Constitutionality of the 
Liquor Bill [1999] ZACC 15; 2000 (1) SA 732; 2000 (1) BCLR 1 at 6. 
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international law is helpful. Section 231, analysed above, provides for certain 
constitutional conditions to be fulfilled before international agreements can 
bind South Africa domestically. Should any of these requirements be 
contravened, a question of constitutionality of conduct that enables such 
contravention would arise. International law is thus inextricably connected 
but auxiliary to the inquiry. For instance, in Earthlife Africa,154 the Western 
Cape High Court held that the agreement at issue did not fulfil the 
constitutional requirements laid out by 231(3) - that the delay in tabling the 
agreement before parliament was unreasonable,155 and in any event the 
correct classification of the agreement was under s 231(2) and not (3) thereby 
mandating a different procedure to be fulfilled.156 The court was only able to 
make the determination of unconstitutionality of the Minister’s conduct in 
respect of classification of the agreement by interpreting the scope and 
content of the agreement at issue.157 However, the primary object of inquiry 
was compliance with constitutional requirements under s 231.  
Similar questions of compliance with constitutional requirements may 
arise in respect of the constitutionality of the executive’s exercise of power 
in signing and negotiating treaties under s 231(1),158 the fulfilment of the 
procedures under ss 231(2) and (3),159 the constitutionality of a self-executing 
provision under s 231(4),160 the fulfilment of procedures under s 231(4) for 
                                                 
154 Earthlife Africa Johannesburg and Another v Minister of Energy and Others 
(19529/2015) [2017] ZAWCHC 50; [2017] 3 All SA 187 (WCC); 2017 (5) SA 227 (WCC). 
155 Ibid 127, 128. 
156 Ibid 116. 
157 Ibid 135. 
158 Section 231(1), as was discussed at great length in Law Society in respect of the 
President’s conduct in signing the Protocol to the SADC Treaty that stripped the SADC 
Tribunal of its individual jurisdiction and hence held to be contrary to the President’s duty 
under s 7(2) to respect protect promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
159 As noted above in Earthlife Africa. 
160 This has never been adjudicated upon so far, but there is much literature on the scope 
and content of self-executing provisions of treaties and South African courts’ reluctance to 
develop a rich jurisprudence in respect of such provisions. See, for a summary of the 
literature, Sanya Samtani, ‘International Law, Access to Courts and Non-Retrogression: Law 
Society v President of RSA’, forthcoming in CCR X (2020) (explaining the missed 
opportunity of the Constitutional Court to clarify the meaning of self-executing treaties in 
relation to the SADC Tribunal). See also, Sandy Liebenberg, South Africa and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Deepening the Synergies, 
at 14-5, forthcoming in South African Judicial Education Journal (2020) (for the beginnings 
of an argument regarding the self-executing nature of some of the provisions of the ICESCR 
and how domestic law may be better aligned with the rights present in the ICESCR on that 
basis). A further exposition of self-executing treaties is outside the scope of this paper – it 
suffices to state that the treatment of the obligations under the ICESCR, to the extent that 
they map onto the Bill of Rights, would not differ significantly with this additional analysis. 
The only case which has briefly touched upon this issue in the context of the ICCPR is 
Claassen v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another [2009] 
ZAWCHC 190, 2010 (2) SACR 451 (WCC), [2010] 4 All SA 197 (WCC) at para 36, and is 
supported by EM Ngolele ‘The Content of the Doctrine of Self-Execution and its Limited 
Effect in South African Law’, (2006) 31 South African Yearbook of International Law 153 
 PIJIP Research Paper No. 61  
SANYA SAMTANI 
34
domestically incorporating a treaty through legislation, and in respect of 
international obligations stemming from customary international law, the 
constitutionality of that rule of customary international law under s 232. 
However, the President’s letter does not allege any of the above 
constitutional problems in respect of the international law aspects of CAB – 
the allegations are broad and focus on the compatibility of CAB with 
international treaties as a substantive matter, rather than any failure to meet 
constitutional requirements. Notwithstanding the merits of the following 
proposition, this raises the question - is the alleged international legal 
incompatibility of a Bill an independent ground for constitutional invalidity 
? The only provisions that speak to some extent in support of this claim would 
be the interpretive provisions that I have outlined in my previous section – 
that in interpreting domestic law, a court is obliged to prefer an interpretation 
consistent with binding international law insofar as that interpretation is a 
reasonable one. Parliament’s obligations in relation to this are limited to 
making it possible for such an interpretation through creating textual hooks 
within its laws.161 This is not in and of itself a ground for constitutional 
invalidity. In respect of international human rights law, however, as I have 
described in my previous section, the obligation is sourced in the Bill of 
Rights. Parliament’s obligation extends to respecting, protecting, promoting 
and fulfilling the Bill of Rights. There is thus a constitutional basis for 
Parliament to take into account international human rights law to the extent 
that it maps onto the Bill of Rights. This still means, however, that any 
constitutional invalidity claims as against international human rights law 
must either be routed through a right in the Bill of Rights, or where it pertains 
to the Bill of Rights as a whole, sourced in s 7(2). Alleged inconsistency with 
international law does not provide an independent ground of referral.  
Neither does the principle of legality. The Constitutional Court in the 
recent Law Society162 decision extended the principle of legality to the 
international plane – holding that the exercise of public power by the 
executive in voting to strip the SADC Tribunal of its jurisdiction as well as 
participating in amending the SADC Protocol through unlawful means 
(unlawful in international law) was unconstitutional.163 In short, on the 
legality issue,164 the judgment holds that the President’s actions on the 
                                                 
(discussing what self-executing treaties mean and their domestic effect in the South African 
context). See also, ME Olivier ‘Exploring the Doctrine of Self-Execution as Enforcement 
Mechanism of International Obligations’, 27 (2002) South African Yearbook of International 
Law 99 (on the point of outlining the specific application of self-executing treaties to the 
ICCPR). 
161 Under s 233, as outlined in Part II.C of this paper. 
162 For a critique of the decision (its outcome on legality as well as the methodology 
employed by the Court in determining the scope and content of international law), see Dire 
Tladi, ‘The Constitutional Court’s Judgment in the SADC Tribunal Case: International Law 
Continues to Befuddle’, forthcoming in CCR X (2020). 
163 Law Society at 61. 
164 The better view in respect of this judgment is that the holding of unconstitutionality 
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international plane were procedurally irrational as he acted beyond the 
powers that were constitutionally conferred upon him in contravening 
existing international legal rules in amending the SADC Protocol.165 In other 
words, irrespective of whether a public functionary acts on the international 
or domestic plane, they cannot act in excess of their powers and they cannot 
act contrary to the Constitution. In relation to international law, this means 
that when an organ of state represents South Africa on the international plane, 
they must comply with the requirements of the relevant international law 
instrument, in good faith. In other words, organs of state or officials must 
comply with the procedural requirements of that particular treaty, for 
example in relation to ratification, voting, withdrawal, or similar acts.  
Law Society is not authority for the proposition that alleged non-
compliance with international law on the international plane, constitutes non-
compliance with domestic law. It does not make international law 
automatically directly enforceable in the domestic system. To read Law 
Society as doing this would render redundant the elaborate scheme of 
classification of international obligations’ domestic effects present in s 231 
of the Constitution.166 The principle of legality cannot mean that all of South 
Africa’s international obligations, regardless of their status, are to be treated 
exactly the same from the perspective of domestic law. Such a reading would 
render redundant ss 231, 232 and 233 that carefully outline certain 
circumstances where international law can be domestically enforceable, and 
those aspects of ss 39(1)(b) and 39(2) that enable international law to fill out 
the content of the rights in the Bill of Rights.  
Moreover, an overbroad reading of Law Society as applied to Parliament 
would be absurd, not only for the reason of redundancy of explicit 
constitutional provisions, but also because it would inhibit Parliament’s law-
making function (and South Africa’s role in giving effect to its international 
obligations in line with its own domestic priorities, as distinct from other 
countries’ priorities). The only limitation on Parliament’s law-making 
function is the Constitution.167 Law Society cannot be read to have created a 
backdoor through the principle of legality to elevate international obligations 
to the level of a constitutional constraint on Parliament’s law-making powers 
                                                 
cannot be delinked from its effect on the right of access to courts. In other words, the 
judgment is premised on the basis that the President did not fulfil his duty under s 7(2) to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil a right in the Bill of Rights (s 34) and in fact acted 
retrogressively to take away access to an existing court (the SADC Tribunal) which existed 
to promote a culture of democracy and human rights (see para 78 of Law Society, for 
instance). For a full argument on this ground, see Sanya Samtani, ‘International Law, Access 
to Courts and Non-Retrogression: Law Society v President of RSA’ forthcoming in CCR X.  
165 Law Society at 61-71. 
166 O’Regan J in Khumalo v Holomisa [2002] ZACC 12, 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 
(8) BCLR 771 (CC). 
167 Section 44(4), Constitution, states: “When exercising its legislative authority, 
Parliament is bound only by the Constitution, and must act in accordance with, and within 
the limits of, the Constitution.” 
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where the Constitution itself does not provide for it. Such a reading is 
contrary to s 44(4) as well as the previously quoted sections. Rather, the work 
that the principle of legality does is different – if for instance, after the 
executive has not followed the correct international legal procedures in 
depositing the instrument of ratification, Law Society would apply there to 
enable that act to be reviewable in South African courts on the basis of 
legality. Moreover, the principle of legality as applied to Parliament has been 
held to mean (1) that domestic statutes must be rationally related a legitimate 
governmental purpose (must not be arbitrary),168 and in ensuring that statutes 
are not vague.169 
In any event, the President has not invoked the principle of legality as a 
ground in his referral letter, and as confirmed by the Constitutional Court in 
Liquor Bill, the Bill is not up for wholesale review at this stage. Rather the 
review must be confined to the President’s referral letter.170 As described 
earlier (and encapsulated by s 233 of the Constitution), the correct standard 
for Parliament is simply to ensure that  if it chooses to legislate to give effect 
to international obligations, the law that is made can be reasonably 
interpreted to be consistent with South Africa’s binding international 
obligations. The obligation under s 233 has been described as an interpretive 
one, rather than one that enables a direct challenge.171    
In sum, it is clear that the scope of the President’s referral under s79(1) 
does not extend to compliance with international law in and of itself as a 
ground. However, this certainly does not mean that international law can be 
flouted (nor that in the present circumstance that it is being flouted at all). 
Rather, as I go on to show in any event, Parliament has interpreted and 
applied international law correctly, according to the constitutional scheme 
and its law-making latitude, in passing the CAB. Even if one assumes that 
the President’s referral letter raises the international law concerns with 
respect to s 233, rather than on its own feet, the impugned provisions of the 
CAB (the exceptions and limitations under ss 12A-D, 19B and C) can be 
reasonably interpreted to demonstrate compatibility with the sum of South 
Africa’s binding international law.172 I turn to this aspect in the next section 
with specific reference to education, but it applies to all the impugned 
exceptions, given that they all give effect to particular constitutional rights. 
I return now to the category of treaties under s 231(2). As described 
above, Parliament is in the process of fulfilling domestic constitutional 
                                                 
168 New National Party of SA v Government of the RSA 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC), 1999 (5) 
BCLR 489 (CC), [1999] ZACC 5 at 24. See also United Democratic Movement v President 
of RSA 2003 (1) SA 488 (CC), 2002 (11) BCLR 1213 (CC), [2002] ZACC 33 at 55. 
169 Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Another 2006 (3) 
SA 247 (CC), 2005 (6) BCLR 529 (CC), [2005] ZACC 3 at 108. 
170 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Constitutionality of the 
Liquor Bill  [1999] ZACC 15; 2000 (1) SA 732; 2000 (1) BCLR 1 at 13-14. 
171 Dugard and Coutsoudis at 99. 
172 The relevant obligations are outlined in Part I of the paper. 
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conditions under s 231(2) in respect of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Marrakesh VIP Treaty and the Beijing 
Audio Visual Treaty.173 In doing so, it has taken a policy decision to include 
certain terms from these treaties in the Copyright Amendment Bill as well as 
the Performers’ Protection Amendment Bill.174 I go on to establish how the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty, Performances and Phonograms Treaty and the 
Beijing Audio Visual Treaty have been incorporated almost in their entirety, 
leaving the President’s concern regarding the economic rights of creators 
under these treaties as outlined in the referral letter somewhat baffling.  
In respect of the Copyright Amendment Bill, several definitions from the 
above treaties have been included, including “accessible format copy”, 
“technological protection measure”, “technological protection measure 
circumvention device” among others.175 Moreover, the scope of copyright 
protection has been expanded to include computer programmes;176 the right 
of communication to the public expanded to include access to literary, 
musical and artistic works through the internet and at their convenience;177 
the rental right expanded to include commercial rental of audio visual works 
(like films, for instance) as well as sound recordings through the internet.178 
In addition, tampering with copyright management information (such as the 
creator’s terms of use that have been set out, for instance) or technological 
protection measures (such as digital rights management controls which limit 
the use of a work under copyright to a particular platform, for instance) have 
been included as offences to enable the further protection of moral and 
economic rights of creators.179 Further provisions for enforcement of anti-
circumvention and restricted conduct in respect of the above offences have 
been provided for in the CAB, along with a strengthened Copyright Tribunal 
for redressal.180 These provisions directly incorporate the obligations that the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty places upon its parties, to ensure that effective legal 
remedies are available to enforce anti-circumvention measures, as well as to 
enforce moral and economic rights in of creators in digital environments.181 
Moreover, in a similar vein, the Performers’ Protection Amendment Bill 
also incorporates the same definitions from the above treaties;182 aims to 
protect the reproduction and communication right of producers of sound 
                                                 
173 See Presentation made by the Department of Trade and Industry to the Select 
Committee available at: http://www.thedtic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/WIPO.pdf 
174 See recent Presentation made by the Department of Trade Industry and Competition 
to the Portfolio Committee available at: http://www.thedtic.gov.za/wp-
content/uploads/Copyright-2020.pdf 
175 Clause 1, CAB. 
176 Clause 2, CAB (Section 2A). 
177 Clause 4, 6 CAB (Section 6, 7). 
178 Clause 8, 10 CAB (Section 8, 9). 
179 Clause 26, 27 CAB (Section 23,27). 
180 Clause 28, 29 CAB (Section 28, 28O-S). 
181 Articles 11-14, WIPO Copyright Treaty.  
182 Clause 1, PPAB. 
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recordings as well as enabling equal remuneration for the performers, 
composers and producers of commercial sound recordings;183 to clearly 
define the contours of the situations where an audio visual work or a sound 
recording may be fixed in an audio visual format and broadcast or 
communicated to the public, and to include a reporting requirement as well 
as a royalty payment or remuneration to the performer for consenting to such 
fixation;184 provides for conduct that is infringing and therefore an offence in 
respect of circumventing copyright management information and 
technological protection measures (analogous to the CAB provisions outlined 
above).185 These provisions directly incorporate the obligations that the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty as well as the Beijing Audio 
Visual Treaty186 places upon its parties, to ensure that effective legal 
remedies are available to enforce anti-circumvention measures, as well as to 
enforce moral and economic rights in of performers and producers in digital 
environments.187 
Crucially, this analysis is not within the ambit of s 79(1). The Constitution 
does not require the President to analyse whether legislation precisely accords 
with the text of a treaty which Parliament is attempting to domesticate. It 
certainly does not empower the President to return a Bill to Parliament on 
that basis. In any event, the above analysis shows that the operative parts of 
these three treaties, at the instance of Parliament, have clearly been 
incorporated into the CAB and PPAB, to transform them into domestic law 
(availing of the process in s 231(4) of the Constitution), in order to 
domestically enforce these rights and obligations.  
A closer look at the concerns raised by the President's letter indicates that 
in addition to the implications regarding economic rights of performers (dealt 
with comprehensively above), the allegation is that the exceptions and 
limitations provisions of the CAB are “in conflict” with the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty, and that they do not fulfil 
the three-step test as outlined in the Marrakesh Treaty. In short, all three 
treaties contain versions of the three-step test, a version of which is also found 
in the Berne Convention (and TRIPS Agreement) to which South Africa is 
already a party. At this stage it is important to recall the earlier analysis, that 
Parliament must be enabled to exercise the wide policy-making berth it is 
constitutionally guaranteed by s 231 and s 44(4), and that all that is 
constitutionally required in respect of international law is for Parliament to 
create the possibility of a reasonable interpretation of legislation that is 
                                                 
183 Clause 3, PPAB. 
184 Clause 4, PPAB. 
185 Clause 7,8 PPAB (Sections 8E-H). 
186 The President’s referral letter does not mention the Beijing Audio Visual Treaty, 
despite its close relationship with the provisions giving effect to the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty.  
187 Articles 18, 19, 23 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty; Articles 15, 16, 20 
Beijing Audio Visual Treaty. 
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compatible with South Africa’s binding international obligations. In respect 
of international human rights, however, the normative imperative is greater 
given Parliament’s extensive constitutional obligations in respect of the Bill 
of Rights. In the next section, I explain the interpretation of the three-step test 
as an auxiliary aspect of Parliament’s primary role in giving effect to the right 
to education under the Bill of Rights, to the extent that copyright acts as a 
barrier to the realisation of this right.  
 THE COPYRIGHT AMENDMENT BILL: EDUCATIONAL EXCEPTIONS 
In this section, I confine my analysis to the provisions outlined in the 
President’s referral letter that directly pertain to access to educational 
materials. The subsequent analysis may be analogously conducted in respect 
of the other exceptions and limitations outlined by the President’s referral 
letter, from the perspective of the affected constitutional rights-bearers, in 
light of South Africa’s international obligations highlighted in the first 
section of this paper. I engage with the correct application of the South 
Africa’s ‘inter-locking’ international obligations in the course of my analysis. 
This includes the Berne Convention, outlined in the President’s letter – but is 
not confined to it. 
 I go on to establish how it is not only constitutionally permitted for 
Parliament to legislate as it has in the CAB on exceptions for educational 
purposes but that it is constitutionally required to discharge Parliament’s s 
7(2) duty in respect of giving effect to the right to basic and higher education 
in the Bill of Rights. Additionally, the CAB is the fulfilment of Parliament’s 
independent duty to bring apartheid-era laws in line with the Bill of Rights.188 
In interpreting rights, s 39(1)(b) makes clear that courts are enjoined to 
consider South Africa’s binding and non-binding international obligations. 
However, more weight is given to binding obligations.189 
   The unconstitutionality of the Copyright Act 1978  
The apartheid-era Copyright Act 1978, provides in its objects that it has 
been enacted “to regulate copyright and to provide for matters incidental 
thereto.”190 This was enacted in the pre-constitutional era by the apartheid 
state, around the same time as a spate of information control and political 
censorship laws, which have been widely documented to be oppressive.191 It 
                                                 
188 Holomisa v Holomisa [2018] ZACC 40; 2019 (2) BCLR 247 (CC); Zondi v MEC for 
Traditional and Local Government Affairs [2004] ZACC 19; 2005 (3) SA 589 (CC); 2005 
(4) BCLR 347 (CC) Ngcobo J at para 36. 
189 S v Makwanyane [1995] ZACC 3, 1995 (3) SA 391 at 35 discusses the analogous s 
35(1) of the Interim Constitution. 
190 Copyright Act 98 of 1978, available at: 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201504/act-98-1978.pdf 
191 See generally John Dugard, “Censorship in South Africa: The Legal Framework” in 
Nadine Gordimer et al, What Happened to Burger's Daughter or How South African 
Censorship Works, Taurus (1980) (providing an overview of the apartheid legal framework 
that perpetuated state censorship); Gilbert Marcus, "Reasonable Censorship?” in Hugh 
Corder, ed., Essays on Law and Social Practice in South Africa Cape Town: Juta, 1988: 349–
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was assented to just two years and four days after the June 16, 1976 Soweto 
uprising in which hundreds of school children were killed or wounded in 
protests against an education system explicitly designed to prepare them for 
servitude.192 Given its historical context, it is clear that the Act was not 
informed by any notion of the Bill of Rights or equality of access to education 
for all, which was created much later by the 1996 Constitution in the 
democratic era. In respect of its provisions on the educational use of materials 
under copyright, the Act is woefully inadequate in respect of respecting, 
protecting, promoting and fulfilling the right to education in the Bill of 
Rights. The provision in the current Act that pertains to accessing copyrighted 
educational materials is s 12(4). It states that:193  
The copyright in a literary or musical work shall not be infringed by using 
such work, to the extent justified by the purpose, by way of illustration in 
any publication, broadcast or sound or visual record for teaching: 
Provided that such use shall be compatible with fair practice and that the 
source shall be mentioned, as well as well as the name of the author if it 
appears on the work. 
This provision particularly focuses solely on literary and musical works 
that are used for the purposes of teaching. Whilst contains the same standards 
of ‘fair practice’ and ‘extent justified by the purpose’ as Article 10(2) of the 
Berne Convention, it excludes any other type of work, other than literary and 
musical works, from being employed for the purposes of teaching, even if 
teaching were to be defined broadly to include various forms of basic and 
higher education and technological advancements in learning. For works 
other than literary and musical works, regard must be had to s 13, a general 
exception that encapsulates the widely-known three-step test. It states that:  
In addition to reproductions permitted in terms of this Act reproduction 
of a work shall also be permitted as prescribed by regulation, but in such 
a manner that the reproduction is not in conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work and is not unreasonably prejudicial to the 
legitimate interests of the owner of the copyright.  
This must be read with the regulations made pursuant to s 13194 – which 
states that such reproduction is permitted in terms of the current Act if not 
                                                 
60. See also, Gavin Stewart, ‘Perfecting the free flow of information: media control in South 
Africa 12 June to 18 November 1986’, Index on Censorship 16(1), 29–38. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03064228708534192 (recording the use of the Copyright Act, 1978 
as a tool for information control alongside the spate of other political censorship laws). 
192 South African History Online, The June 16 Soweto Youth Uprising, available at 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/june-16-soweto-youth-uprising (explaining that one of 
the key reasons for the uprising was the racially differentiated quality of education made 
available, with inferior education for Black people as a means for furthering apartheid). 
193 Section 12(4), Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
194 Regulations pursuant to s 13 of the Copyright Act (Copyright Regulations 1978 (as 
amended by GN 1375 in GG 9807 of June 28, 1985), available at: 
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/130435. 
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more than one copy of “a reasonable portion of the work is made, having 
regard to the totality and meaning of the work” and “if the cumulative effect 
of the reproductions does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the 
work to the unreasonable prejudice of the legal interest and residuary rights 
of the author.” This would lead to the absurd situation that for artistic and 
cinematographic works (works that are outside the scope of s 12), even 
though such works may be required to be reproduced in order for students to 
effectively study them in their course of education, only one copy may be 
made by the teacher (instead of a digital course pack in respect of film studies 
courses, for instance). It is unclear how this would work in respect of the 
second constraint “regard to the totality and meaning of the work”. It is also 
absurd as artistic works often form a part and parcel of literary works in 
respect of textbooks that employ diagrammatic representations, for instance.  
Additionally, the regulations on the reproduction of copyrighted materials 
by library and archives for a user state a limit of “not more than one article 
or other contribution to a copyrighted collection or periodical issue, or to a 
copy of a reasonable portion of any other copyrighted work” and have a 
further proviso that such a copy must be used only for private study or 
personal use. Thus although s 12(4) does not specify a numerical limit on the 
number of copies that can be made, the regulations under s 13 constrain the 
scope of s 12(4), since photocopies for educational purposes (illustrations for 
teaching), take place in university and public libraries.    
Moreover, the current Act does not enable the creation of accessible 
format copies of works for persons with disabilities even in respect of 
accessing educational materials.   
This is all to say that it is highly likely that the current Copyright Act of 
1978 will not pass constitutional muster under s 36, on the basis that it 
unjustifiably limits the fulfilment of the right to basic and higher education 
under s 29 and is discriminatory to persons with disabilities and persons 
living in poverty under s 9(3). The provisions in the CAB are thus necessary 
to ensure that copyright does not inhibit access to educational materials and 
that the CAB enables the full enforcement of the Bill of Rights. 
   The right to education and educational materials  
In this section I will outline the right to education in the Bill of Rights. 
What the President entitles “noble objectives” of the CAB to enable access 
to copyrighted materials for “the visually impaired, educators, students and 
others”, are actually more than just noble objectives: they are rights that are 
protected by the Bill of Rights that give rise to obligations incumbent upon 
all organs of state. Here, I focus on the equal right of access to educational 
materials for all – and how CAB contains provisions that are fulfil 
Parliament’s constitutional duty to give effect to the Bill of Rights. 
Additionally, I will explain how international law (both international human 
rights law and international copyright law as outlined in the first section) 
should be used to construct the scope of the right of access to educational 
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materials in the Bill of Rights and the corresponding duty that Parliament has 
to enact laws to ensure that the Bill of Rights is respected, protected, 
promoted and fulfilled.  
The right to education is found in s 29 of the Constitution.195 Given the 
apartheid-era historical and systemic deprivation of education for the 
majority of the population, courts have consistently affirmed and upheld the 
various aspects of this right in order to redress this systemic disadvantage.196  
The right to a basic education is immediately realisable.197 This is in 
contrast with s 29(1)(b), the right to further education, as well as other socio-
economic rights, which explicitly provide that the state is obliged to take 
positive steps towards the progressive realisation of the right. The educational 
use of materials under copyright is common to both further and basic 
education – it is only the extent of obligations that are imposed upon the state 
that differ.    
1.   The right to basic education and its corresponding duties  
The content of the right to basic education under Section 29(1)(a) has 
been litigated extensively.198 Much of the litigation has centred around 
overcoming barriers to the realisation of the right to education and mandating 
the state to fulfil its obligations.199 The litigation surrounding the deprivation 
of textbooks is particularly significant in relation to accessing educational 
materials.200 
Courts have affirmed the necessity of textbooks to realising the right to 
basic education. Kollapen J, in the Supreme Court of Appeal, held that:201 
                                                 
195 The relevant part of the education guarantee under s 29(1) of the Constitution states 
that: “Everyone has the right— (a) to a basic education, including adult basic education; and 
(b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make 
progressively available and accessible.” 
196 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay [2007] ZACC 21, 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) 
at 121-124; Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School & Others v Essay N.O. 
[2011] ZACC 13, 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) at 42. 
197 Ibid (Juma Musjid) at 37. 
198 Cameron McConnachie, ‘Litigating the Right to Basic Education’ in Jason Brickhill 
(ed) Public Interest Litigation in South Africa, (JUTA, 2018) 288-297 (analysing the various 
streams of litigation in South African courts that led to filling out the content of the right to 
basic education). 
199 Madzodzo v Minister of Basic Education [2014] ZAECMHC 5, 2014 (3) SA 441 
(ECM); Linkside v Minister of Basic Education [2015] ZAECGHC 36 at 2,4; Tripartite 
Steering Committee v Minister of Basic Education [2015] ZAECGHC 67, 2015 (5) SA 107 
(ECG); Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability v Government of the Republic of 
South Africa [2010] ZAWCHC 544; Komape v Minister of Basic Education [2018] 
ZALMPPHC 18; MEC for Education in Gauteng v Governing Body of Rivonia Primary 
[2013] ZACC 34, 2013 (6) SA 582 (CC). 
200 Minister of Basic Education v Basic Education for All [2015] ZASCA 198, 2016 (4) 
SA 63 (SCA). 
201 Section 27 v Minister of Education 2013 (2) SA 40 (GNP), 2013 (2) SA 40 (GNP) at 
25. 
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[T]he provision of learner support material in the form of textbooks, as 
may be prescribed is an essential component of the right to basic 
education and its provision is inextricably linked to the fulfilment of the 
right. In fact, it is difficult to conceive, even with the best of intentions, 
how the right to basic education can be given effect to in the absence of 
textbooks. 
This was affirmed by Tuchten J’s order in the subsequent High Court 
proceedings,202 which stated that the state must ensure that every learner was 
provided with a textbook in order to fulfill their right to a basic education.203 
The Supreme Court of Appeal dealt centrally with this issue and affirmed the 
principle of providing each learner with a textbook as an integral part of the 
right to education.204 In late 2014, the Department of Basic Education 
published a Draft National Policy for the Provision and Management of 
Learning and Teaching Support Material (LTSM).205 Along with other 
materials, this policy also dealt with the provisioning of educational 
materials. It split LTSM into ‘core’ materials, that were integral to the 
teaching of the curriculum of a particular grade, and ‘supplementary’ 
materials, that were meant to ‘enhance a specific part of the curriculum’. The 
former includes essential textbooks and teacher guides whilst the latter 
includes provisioning of libraries with books such as reference guides, 
dictionaries, atlases etc.206 As a recent study finds, the crucial role of LTSM 
in improving educational outcomes for all is only realised where LTSM is 
accessible to all.207 Section 12D of CAB clearly envisions the provision of 
textbooks as well as other materials required for the realisation of the right to 
basic education.  
The right to basic education, as described above, gives rise to state 
obligations to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights’ under s 7(2) of the Constitution. The state encompasses government 
funded schools as well as the organs of state. The positive duties to ‘fulfil’ 
the right to basic education include the duty to provide textbooks and other 
learning materials. This includes the construction and provisioning of 
                                                 
202 And then further affirmed by Minister of Basic Education v Basic Education for All 
[2015] ZASCA 198. 
203 Basic Education For All v Minister of Basic Education [2014] ZAGPPHC 251, 2014 
(4) SA 274 (GP) 82. 
204 Supra note 201 at 52. 
205 ‘Draft Policy on Provision and Management of Learning and Teaching Support 
Material (LTSM)’ (Department of Basic Education, September 2014) 
<https://www.education.gov.za/Portals/0/Documents/Policies/Draft_%20LTSM%20Policy
%20for%20Public%20Comments%202014).pdf?ver=2015-01-29-170953-293> accessed 
on 21 June 2019. 
206 Veriava, supra note 43, 40-41. 
207 Milligan, LO, Koornhof, H, Sapire, I & Tikly, L 2019, 'Understanding the role of 
learning and teaching support materials in enabling learning for all', Compare : A Journal of 
Comparative and International Education, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 529-547. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03057925.2018.1431107 (exploring LTSM use in Rwanda and 
South Africa). 
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libraries in educational institutions, as well as the provisioning of scanning 
and photocopying machines to facilitate distance learning and private study. 
In doing so, the state bears an obligation to protect rights-bearers against 
potential violations by third parties. This is precisely what s 12D of the CAB 
seeks to do. Further, the negative obligation to respect the right requires the 
state not to pass obstructing legislation or to put policy in place that prevents 
access to materials for the fulfilment of the right to education. Where there 
are pre-existing statutory provisions that could be construed as obstructions, 
these provisions must first be interpreted to give full effect to the Bill of 
Rights, and where that is impossible, the statute must be amended to bring it 
in line with the Bill of Rights.    
This duty also extends to private actors under s 8(2) of the Constitution, 
where it is required by the nature of the right and the duty.208 Since 
educational materials and textbooks are published and distributed by private 
actors, these intermediaries play a fundamental role as gatekeepers of these 
aspects of the right to education.209 
The Constitutional Court most recently in Pridwin  confirmed that at the 
very least, private actors bear a duty to not inhibit the realisation of the right 
to education. In other words, where the right to education was being fulfilled 
by private actors, they could not “without appropriate justification” withdraw 
that fulfilment of the right. In doing so, the majority held that although in this 
instance it was a negative duty, this did not prevent private actors from 
potentially bearing positive duties in other circumstances.210 In Juma Musjid, 
the Constitutional Court also recognised that the trust bore a negative duty 
(which it discharged in that specific case) to respect the learners’ right to a 
basic education, which it characterised as the duty “not to interfere with or 
diminish the enjoyment of a right”.211 Though at present, it is unclear to what 
extent private actors may bear positive obligations in respect of the right to 
education (to provide educational materials to learners as the state does), what 
is clear is that these actors have a duty not to prevent access to materials for 
                                                 
208 See McConnachie, supra note 198 at 287; Stu Woolman & Michael Bishop, 
Education in Constitutional Law of South Africa at 57-9 available at 
https://constitutionallawofsouthafrica.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Chap57.pdf 
(providing an overview of the content of the right and the obligations that flow from it); See 
also Khumalo v Holomisa [2002] ZACC 12, 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) at 33 (in the context of 
freedom of expression and the extent of the duty imposed on private actors). 
209 The Competition Commission has recognised this as recently as August 2018 and 
launched an investigation into price-fixing of textbooks and other educational materials by 
the Publishers Association of South Africa as well as its 91 member publishers. Media 
Release, ‘The Commission Uncovers Cartel of Book Publishers’ (Competition Commission, 
29 August 2018) available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/Media-Release-PASA-1.pdf. 
210 AB and Another v Pridwin Preparatory School and Others [2020] ZACC 12 at 125, 
180. 
211 Ibid 58, 60, 64. For an analysis of the scope of the duty see Meghan Finn, Befriending 
the Bogeyman: Direct Horizontal Application in AB v Pridwin, South African Law Journal 
(forthcoming). 
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the purpose of fulfilling the right to education. The state’s duty thus extends 
to regulating private actors so to ensure the realisation of the right to 
education. Moreover, the state has been compelled to promulgate regulations 
in the past, in order to fulfil the right to basic education.212 The provisions on 
educational purposes in CAB is an instance of the state legislating to fulfil its 
obligations under the Bill of Rights.  
2.   The right to higher education and its corresponding duties  
Further education, by implication, covers all forms of education that do 
not fall within ‘basic education’. Tuchten J, in a further round of proceedings 
in the Limpopo textbooks litigation, stated obiter that ‘[t]extbooks are 
essential to all forms of education’.213 Most recently, student activists, 
through the Fees Must Fall protests,214 have been making demands for the 
state to provide fee-free further education with a view to realising the right to 
further education in s 29(1)(b).215 In order to address the grievances raised by 
the protestors and look into the feasibility of fee-free further education, the 
President set up a Commission of Inquiry into Higher Education and 
Training. The Commission quoted students’ submissions with approval and 
concluded that, ‘[thus] it has been emphasised (and persuasively so) that 
tuition is for the great majority of the student body (and also for the aspirant 
student population) of little practical value without food, accommodation, 
transport, books, computers/tools/equipment, internet connectivity, health 
care and in many instances, family support’.216 The Commission therefore 
considered educational materials a key input to realising the right to further 
education in South Africa (as the courts held in relation to textbooks and basic 
education).  
Under international law, the right to education includes within it access 
to educational materials for all levels of education – including university level 
education, which falls under ‘further education’ in s 29(1)(b).217 The only 
difference between s 29(1)(a) and (b) is the extent to which the state is obliged 
                                                 
212 Minister of Basic Education promulgated Regulations Relating to Minimum Uniform 
Norms and Standards for Public School Infrastructure on 29 November 2013 after litigation 
by the LRC and Equal Education. 
213 Supra note 203 at 51. 
214 Fees must fall is a national student activist protest movement that began in South 
Africa in mid-October 2015. Its demands were to stop further increases in university fees – 
more radically, that further education be free and that the curriculum be decolonised. It 
resulted in no university fee increases in 2016 and increased government funding for 
universities. See Department of Higher Education and Training, ‘Report of the Commission 
of Enquiry into Higher Education and Training to the President of the Republic of South 
Africa’, (Department of Higher Education and Training, 13 Nov 2017) 9-20 
<http://www.dhet.gov.za/Commissions%20Reports/Report%20of%20Commission%20of%
20Inquiry%20into%20the%20Feasibility%20of%20Making%20Higher%20Education%20
and%20Training%20Fee-free%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf> (‘Fee Commission Report’). 
215 Hotz v University of Cape Town [2017] ZACC 10, 2018 (1) SA 369 (CC) at 31. 
216 Ibid at 145. 
217 See Part I of this paper. 
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to provide textbooks and other learning materials at different levels. 
The right under s 29(1)(b) is qualified by the state’s obligation to take 
reasonable measures to make further education accessible and available. This 
applies equally to the essential inputs to education, and specifically 
educational materials. The CAB is one form of fulfilment of the state’s duties 
that does not require an extensive amount of resources for the provisioning 
of material infrastructure, like the building of new universities would, for 
instance – rather it is a regulatory response that does not lead to massive 
budgetary implications. A regulatory response to simply make available what 
is already there is well within the state’s duties under s 7(2) to take reasonable 
measures to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the right. An invocation of 
the principle of progressive realisation in delaying the state’s fulfilment of 
this obligation is not tenable given the immediacy of the need and the ease 
with which the state may fulfil it.218  
   The Bill of Rights as a constitutional magnet for the CAB’s 
educational exceptions  
The quoted parts of the following provisions pertain to those uses that are 
expressly exempted from copyright, on the basis that they fulfil educational 
purposes, as legislated in the CAB: 
12A. ‘General exceptions from copyright protection’  
(a) In addition to uses specifically authorized, fair use in respect of a 
work or the performance of that work, for purposes such as the 
following, does not infringe copyright in that work:  
(i)  Research, private study or personal use, including the use of a 
lawful copy of the work at a different time or with a different device; 
[…] 
(iv)  scholarship, teaching and education; […] 
(b) In determining whether an act done in relation to a work 
constitutes fair use, all relevant factors shall be taken into account, 
including but not limited to—  
(i)  the nature of the work in question;  
(ii)  the amount and substantiality of the part of the work affected by 
the act in relation to the whole of the work;   
(iii)  the purpose and character of the use, including whether—  
(aa) such use serves a purpose different from that of the work 
affected; and  
(bb) it is of a commercial nature or for non-profit research, library or 
educational purposes; and  
(iv) the substitution effect of the act upon the potential market for the 
                                                 
218 See Katharine Young, ‘Waiting for Rights: Progressive Realization and Lost Time’ 
in Katharine G. Young (ed), The Future of Economic and Social Rights, Cambridge 
University Press (2019) (for an overview of progressive realisation and the particular effect 
that delays have on rights-bearers). 
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work in question.  
 
12B. ‘Specific exceptions from copyright protection applicable to all 
works’  
(1) Copyright in a work shall not be infringed by any of the following 
acts: […] 
(b)  any illustration in a publication, broadcast, sound or visual record 
for the purpose of teaching: Provided that such use shall not exceed 
the extent justified by the purpose: Provided further that, to the extent 
that it is practicable, the source and the name of the author, if it 
appears on or in the work, shall be mentioned in the act of teaching or 
in the illustration in question; […] 
 
12D. ‘Reproduction for educational and academic activities’  
(1) Subject to subsection (3), a person may make copies of works or 
recordings of works, including broadcasts, for the purposes of 
educational and academic activities: Provided that the copying does 
not exceed the extent justified by the purpose.  
(2) Educational institutions may incorporate the copies made under 
subsection (1) in printed and electronic course packs, study packs, 
resource lists and in any other material to be used in a course of 
instruction or in virtual learning environments, managed learning 
environments, virtual research environments or library environments 
hosted on a secure network and accessible only by the persons giving 
and receiving instruction at or from the educational establishment 
making such copies.  
(3) Educational institutions shall not incorporate the whole or 
substantially the whole of a book or journal issue, or a recording of a 
work, unless a licence to do so is not available from the copyright 
owner, collecting society or an indigenous community on reasonable 
terms and conditions.  
(4) The right to make copies contemplated in subsection (1) extends 
to the reproduction of a whole textbook—  
(a)  where the textbook is out of print; 
(b)  where the owner of the right cannot be found; or  
(c)  where authorized copies of the same edition of the textbook are 
not for sale in the Republic or cannot be obtained at a price reasonably 
related to that normally charged in the Republic for comparable 
works.  
(5) The right to make copies shall not extend to reproductions for 
commercial purposes. 
(6) Any person receiving instruction may incorporate portions of 
works in printed or electronic form in an assignment, portfolio, thesis 
or a dissertation for submission, personal use, library deposit or 
posting on an institutional repository. 
(7) (a) The author of a scientific or other contribution, which is the 
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result of a research activity that received at least 50 per cent of its 
funding from the state and which has appeared in a collection, has the 
right, despite granting the publisher or editor an exclusive right of use, 
to make the final manuscript version available to the public under an 
open licence or by 50 means of an open access institutional repository.  
(b) In the case of a contribution published in a collection that is issued 
periodically at least annually, an agreement may provide for a delay 
in the exercise of the author’s right referred to in paragraph (a) for up 
to 12 months from the date of the first publication in that periodical.   
(c) When the contribution is made available to the public as 
contemplated in paragraph (a), the place of the first publication must 
be properly acknowledged.  
(d) Third parties, such as librarians, may carry out activities 
contemplated in paragraphs (a) to (c) on behalf of the author.  
(e) Any agreement that denies the author any of the rights 
contemplated in this subsection shall be unenforceable.  
(8) The source of the work reproduced and the name of the author 
shall be indicated as far as is practicable on all copies contemplated 
in subsections (1) to (6).  
 
The above provisions comprehensively provide for access to educational 
materials taking into account the lived realities of students219 – and the 
particular advancements of technologies that have transformed the 
educational landscape, particularly in the past few months during the global 
pandemic. The provisions recognise that access to educational materials takes 
place through course packs as well as digital learning environments. They 
also recognise that there may be limited circumstances for the copying of a 
whole textbook, but the limits of such copying are clearly enumerated. 
Authors’ moral rights are consistently reiterated throughout these provisions. 
These are hardly novel creations – various countries have similar such 
provisions in their copyright laws such as India220 and Canada,221 amongst 
                                                 
219 See Laura Czerniewicz, Student Practices in Copyright Culture: Accessing Learning 
Resources, Learning Media and Technology, 2017, 42-2, pp11-184 (finding that 
photocopying plays an indispensable role in enabling access to educational materials for 
students). See also, Eve Gray and Laura Czerniewicz. Access to learning resources in post-
apartheid South Africa in Joe Karaganis (ed), Shadow Libraries: Access to educational 
materials in global higher education (2018) MIT Press (providing an overview of how 
students access educational materials in the post apartheid-era and the costs that families bear 
to educate children despite the right to education being constitutionally guaranteed). 
220 Section 52(1)(i) and (a), Indian Copyright Act, 1957. The Chancellor, Masters & Scholars 
of University of Oxford & Ors v Rameshwari Photocopy Services & Ors 160 DRJ (SN) 678 
(2016) available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/114459608/(for an interpretation of the 
provisions on access to educational materials as focusing on equitable access to materials). 
221 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada 2004 SCC 13; [2004] 1 SCR 339. 
This was further confirmed in Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency 
(Access Copyright) 2012 SCC 37, [2012] 2 SCR 345 
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others.222 
When legislating on a matter that has the potential to infringe upon a right 
in the Bill of Rights, the Constitution sets out a test in s 36 as outlined above. 
In statutorily creating and regulating copyright, the legislature must take into 
account any possible infringements upon rights protected by the Bill of 
Rights. As I outlined in my first section, there are a number of rights in the 
Bill of Rights that are implicated by copyright – children’s rights, the right to 
education, freedom of expression, access to information, the right to 
participation in cultural activities and the right to equality that runs as a thread 
throughout this analysis to ensure that everyone has access to such materials 
without discrimination (particularly, persons with disabilities and those 
facing historical and material socio-economic disadvantage).  
Sections 12A, B and D outlined above specifically exempt certain uses 
from being covered by the restraint of copyright in order to ensure that the 
CAB passes muster under s 36. These provisions are thus tailored to realise 
the right to education, that would otherwise be infringed, were it not for their 
inclusion. In other words, the exceptions and limitations that the President 
calls into question are those that would act to save the CAB in a s 36 analysis 
of the right of access to educational materials under the Constitution.  
 The President, in his referral letter, appears to be concerned about the 
application of the right against arbitrary deprivation of property in respect of 
the above exceptions as well.223 In the first instance, it is difficult to see how 
the realisation of the right to education through the limitation of a statutory 
monopoly to apply to only those uses that are not educational in nature can 
amount to arbitrary deprivation of property. In other words, it is an open 
question as to whether statutory copyright is constitutionally protected as 
property. But even if it is, in its very conception copyright excludes those 
exceptional uses that are for educational purposes from its ambit. Therefore 
the argument that exceptions and limitations for educational purposes 
amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of property is based on the erroneous 
premise that these uses were included within the bounds of copyright’s 
statutory monopoly in the first place.  
 Moreover, a careful reading of the constitutional property 
jurisprudence indicates that courts have never held for copyright, patents or 
trademarks to be constitutionally protected by s 25(1).224 However, even if 
                                                 
222 The US’ fair use provisions have been widely discussed in this debate. See for example, 
Sean Flynn, Peter Jaszi and Mike Carroll, Inside Views: Defending Fair Use In South Africa, 
Intellectual Property Watch, available at: https://www.ip-watch.org/2018/12/04/defending-
fair-use-south-africa/ (explaining the contours of fair use and its origin and compatibility 
with the three-step test). 
223 Referral letter at 15.1. 
224 Sanya Samtani, ‘The Right of Access to Educational Materials’, doctoral research 
(forthcoming). For a snapshot of the argument, see Sanya Samtani, Parliament can uphold 
the Constitution by passing the Copyright Amendment Bill — again, Daily Maverick (12 
July 2020), available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-07-12-
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one takes the property argument at its most ambitious highest, it is extremely 
unlikely for a court to hold that the protection of several rights in the Bill of 
Rights, including the right to education is an arbitrary deprivation of property 
at all.225 This is particularly so because considering that almost all copyright 
laws in the world have educational exceptions and it is a well-established 
exemption from the reach of copyright’s monopoly. 
 A s 36 limitations analysis must be an all-things-considered 
analysis226 – and it is highly likely that s 12A-D of the CAB outlined above 
will pass constitutional muster on the basis that it gives effect to a number of 
rights in the Bill of Rights. Given that s 233 binds courts to select a reasonable 
interpretation of a statute that is consistent with international law the real 
question that is at issue is: whether the CAB can be reasonably interpreted to 
be consistent with international law.  
Of course it can – in respect of the educational exceptions I have outlined 
above. The inter-locking network of binding treaty obligations outlined in 
Part I of this paper include not only the Berne Convention (which makes 
specific provision for access to copyrighted materials for educational 
purposes) but also South Africa’s international human rights obligations 
under the ICESCR, UNCRPD, CRC amongst other binding treaties227 that 
particularly highlight the importance of the right to education for human 
flourishing. The obligations incumbent upon South Africa in respect of both 
sets of treaties have been outlined in Part I. It serves to reiterate that South 
Africa has a positive obligation to provide textbooks and other learning 
materials and where that obligation is subject to progressive realisation, 
South Africa at the very least has an obligation to enable access to such 
materials under human rights law. Under international copyright law, South 
Africa has an obligation to create and regulate copyright and is permitted to 
craft exceptions and limitations to copyright for educational purposes subject 
to fair practice. Where educational uses are outside of the scope of 
“illustrations…for teaching”, they would be subject to the three-step test. In 
other words, although the creation of exceptions and limitations in the 
relevant international copyright treaties is permissive, South Africa’s 
international human rights obligations as well as constitutional obligations 
under the Bill of Rights requires the inclusion of these provisions in order to 
                                                 
parliament-can-uphold-the-constitution-by-passing-the-copyright-amendment-bill-again/ 
(explaining the court’s inconsistent property jurisprudence and outlining that intellectual 
property has not yet been included within the ambit of s 25). See also Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental 
Affairs And Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23; 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC); 
2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) (calling the jurisprudence of the Court on property ‘a vexed 
question’). 
225 Theunis Roux, Property, in Woolman & Bishop, Constitutional law of South Africa 
available at: https://constitutionallawofsouthafrica.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Chap46.pdf (see particularly Roux’s arbitrariness vortex). 
226 As outlined in Part II of this paper. 
227 As outlined in Part I of this paper. 
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ensure that the right to education at all levels is realised; that copyright does 
not act as a barrier to the right to education for all. In legislating on the CAB, 
Parliament therefore properly interprets and gives effect to the sum of South 
Africa’s international obligations and protects constitutional rights bearers. 
The contention that finds mention in the President’s letter is the concern 
that the CAB’s provisions on educational exceptions do not fulfil the three-
step test. At the very outset, it is important to flag that there are two relevant 
tests at issue – first, the Berne Convention creates a specific standard for 
educational exceptions, that they must be compatible with “fair practice” and 
“to the extent justified by the purpose”.228 Second, those exceptions falling 
outside the ambit of this article, must comply with the three-step test.229 The 
CAB’s educational exceptions are compatible with fair practice – none of the 
provisions are absolute, most of them include levers for a reasonableness or 
fairness enquiry, as well as conditions that trigger their application. Most 
importantly, the use is only justified to the extent that it is for educational 
purposes.230 In any event, even if educational exceptions are to be considered 
in light of the three-step test, they are highly likely compliant.231 The three-
step test, as a provision in a treaty, must be interpreted using the VCLT rules 
of interpretation – this necessitates taking into account other relevant rules of 
international law,232 as well as subsequent practice of states parties to the 
TRIPS Agreement and the Berne Convention.233 Here, those rules of 
international law are the right to education and obligations stemming from 
human rights law.234  
Importantly, there can be no circumstance where South Africa interprets 
the three-step test to preclude its fulfilment of (1) other international 
obligations (such as its human rights obligations) or (2) constitutional 
                                                 
228 Article 10(2), Berne Convention. 
229 Article 9(2), Berne Convention. 
230 This is in line with most WIPO members’ legislation around the world. See, for similar 
legislation in other countries most recently, Daniel Seng, Copyright Limitations and 
Exceptions for Educational and Research Activities: Typology Analysis, SCCR/38/8, Thirty-
Eight Session Geneva, April 1 to 5, 2019 (providing a typology of the educational exceptions 
of all 191 WIPO member states). See also, Daniel Seng, Updated Study and Additional 
Analysis of Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for Educational Activities, 
SCCR/35/5 REV. Thirty-Fifth Session, November 13 to 17, 2017 (providing a 
comprehensive analysis of common elements in all 191 WIPO member states’ educational 
exceptions in copyright laws). 
231 See Tobias Schonwetter, ‘Expert Opinion to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and 
Industry concerning ss 12A to 19D’, available at: 
https://static.pmg.org.za/181031opinion.pdf (explaining how the provisions outlined above 
are compatible with the three-step test). See also, Tobias Schonwetter, ‘Written Comments 
on the Copyright Amendment Bill [B13B – 2017]’, UCT IP Unit, available at: 
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Schonwetter-NCoP-Submission-
February-2019.pdf 
232 Article 31(3)(c), VCLT. 
233 Article 31(3)(b), VCLT. See Seng, supra note 230 for a comprehensive overview of the 
subsequent practice of states on this issue. 
234 See Part II of this paper.  
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obligations, stemming from the Bill of Rights and s 7(2) in particular. A 
restrictive interpretation of this sort is highly unlikely to be reasonable.  
Since states are subjects of international law how they domestically 
implement their international obligations contributes to the heterogenous, 
pluralistic manner in which the international obligations may be 
interpreted.235 In South Africa, the Constitution further creates a hierarchy 
where international obligations that map onto the Bill of Rights are 
enforceable to the extent to which they give content to the rights in the Bill 
of Rights or the duties that flow from such rights. 
CONCLUSION: BILL OF RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
It is a widely accepted principle that there is wide amplitude available to 
countries in domestically implementing their international obligations. This 
is known by several names in respect of various areas of international law, 
the most common being “deference”.236 International obligations are often 
drafted at high levels of abstraction, in order to secure political consensus. 
The specific details of implementation are largely left to domestic authorities 
to best strike a balance on the basis of their constitutional, cultural and socio-
economic conditions.  
 International law has various entry points in the above analysis: (1) in 
determining the overall interpretive effect of South Africa’s binding, inter-
locking obligations on copyright and international human rights law, which 
have an important bearing on the interpretation of the impugned provisions 
of the CAB; (2) in the interpretation of specific constitutional rights – for 
instance, in respect of s 29, the right to basic and higher education, and 
determining whether access to copyrighted materials for educational 
purposes is a part of the right as well as in determining the scope of the state’s 
duties that flow from it.  
Significantly, international law, in and of itself, cannot form a direct, 
independent constraint on Parliament’s law-making powers. As explained 
earlier, Parliament’s law-making power is only constrained by the 
Constitution. This does not mean that international law is irrelevant to 
Parliament’s law-making function, but merely that the effect of international 
law must always be mediated through the provisions of the Constitution itself, 
in particular ss 39, 231, 233 and the rights in the Bill of Rights. As a result of 
these provisions, international law obligations that map onto the Bill of 
Rights must be given greater weight in Parliamentary law-making. The 
provisions of the CAB on educational exceptions are a step towards the 
                                                 
235 Margaret Chon, A Rough Guide to Global Intellectual Property Pluralism (November 16, 
2009). Oxford University Press, Forthcoming, Seattle University School of Law Research 
Paper No. 09-01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1507343 
236 Andrew Legg, ‘Deference in International Human Rights Law,’ PhD thesis, 2011, Oxford 
University, UK. See also, Machiko Kanetake and André Nollkaemper, The Rule of Law at 
the National and International Levels: Contestations and Deference, Studies in International 
Law, Hart Publishing, 2016. 
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fulfilment of Parliament’s constitutional obligations – both under s 7(2) to 
give effect to rights in the Bill of Rights as well as to bring apartheid-era 
domestic statutes in line with the Bill of Rights. In drafting these provisions, 
South Africa is furthering a legitimate interpretation of the sum of its 
international copyright law obligations (including the three-step test as 
applied to South Africa), its international human rights obligations and its 
constitutional obligations. In this way, Parliament is exercising its law-
making power in the field of the Bill of Rights’ magnetic effect. In drafting 
and passing the CAB, Parliament’s policy choices are closely aligned with 
the Bill of Rights. This is uncontroversial, given Parliament’s constitutional 
obligation to do so. Parliament is operating firmly within the realm of 
possible interpretations within the framework of international copyright law, 
human rights law and constitutional law.  
